Constitutional Status of Academic Freedom in the United States by HUNTER, Howard
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Law School of Law
12-1981
Constitutional Status of Academic Freedom in the
United States
Howard HUNTER
Singapore Management University, howardhunter@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01096192
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research
Part of the Higher Education Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Law by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
HUNTER, Howard. Constitutional Status of Academic Freedom in the United States. (1981). Minerva. 19, (4), 519-568. Research
Collection School Of Law.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/799
 The Constitutional Status of Academic
 Freedom in the United States
 HOWARD O. HUNTER
 The history of universities has been one of intermittent struggle between
 them or their constituent members and external groups seeking to
 exercise control over the activities of teachers and students. Many major
 European and American universities first developed in close co-ordination
 with churches. The ecclesiastical authorities long exercised, and some-
 times still do exercise, great control over curriculum, pedagogy and
 extracurricular activities.1 Orthodoxy, not free inquiry, has more often than
 not been the demand of the church. The secularisation of universities has
 freed them from much of the imposed religious orthodoxy, but has brought
 new agents of control into the picture, the most notable of which are private
 benefactors and the state. Private beneficence has been marked by the
 fewest intrusions, but except in the United States, Canada and Japan,
 private wealth has been an insignificant source of support in comparison to
 governmental largesse. Even so, the great donors of privately accumulated
 wealth have not always been willing to yield all control over the ways in
 which their gifts have been used by universities.
 The state has largely supplanted the church and individual multimil-
 lionaires as the patron of modern higher education. When compared to the
 degree of direct control occasionally exercised by the church, democratic
 governments have been remarkably lenient benefactors, and some argue
 that the good derived from the support of the state has far outweighed the
 attempts at control imposed from time to time by the authority of the state.
 Despite differences among countries, academic freedom in Western
 societies encompasses: individual freedom to inquire into the nature of the
 world, subject to minimal external restraints; individual freedom to engage
 in rational discourse with colleagues inside and outside academic institu-
 tions, and individual freedom to speak and to publish. These are freedoms of
 any member of a democratic society. Nevertheless, they are absolutely
 critical to the fulfilment of the tasks of a university- learning and teaching.
 The freedoms which comprise the core of academic freedom are essen-
 tially those of individuals. They do not necessarily provide a basis for the
 protection of institutional autonomy, but coupled with the interest of indi-
 vidual scholars and scientists in associating with persons engaged in similar
 enterprises and the necessity for co-operative efforts to pursue individual
 scholarly and scientific interests, there may be an argument developed for
 1 A recent example was the censure of Professor Hans Küng for departing from the orthodoxy of the
 Roman Catholic Church. The colourful history of Uppsala University includes some weighty conflicts with
 the church. See Lindroth, Sten,/! History of Uppsala University 1477-1977 (Uppsala: Almquist and Wiksell,
 1976). There are countless other examples.
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 the recognition of an institutional academic freedom distinct from but
 complementary to the sum of individual interests.
 Historically, the protection of academic freedom has come about through
 tradition, custom and status. The degree to which university teachers have
 been free to teach and inquire has depended on the customs, subject to
 ecclesiastical or political controls, of their respective societies. More
 recently in the United States, the law has taken on an expanded role in the
 protection of such interests from external control. This has coincided with an
 expanded intrusion of other laws and regulations into the university. The
 American constitutional experience provides a useful framework for the
 consideration of academic freedom of inquiry and speech.
 Reliance on law and the legal process for the protection of academic
 freedom is not without significant dangers. It tends to promote the adversar-
 ial process as a means for the resolution of disputes, and it necessarily
 involves persons outside the university as arbiters of what may often be
 issues very important to the well-being of an academic institution. These
 arbiters come armed with the full power of the state and may themselves
 become intruders no less noxious than the bureaucrats with whom acade-
 mics must regularly deal. At the same time, legal protection for the central
 values of academic freedom represents a public recognition of the impor-
 tance of those values to the well-being of a democratic society.
 Academic Freedom and the American Constitution: The Legal Framework
 What university teachers do- talk, write, read, think, inquire- is, in
 essence, what the first amendment to the United States Constitution2 pro-
 tects from the interference of the state. A similar protection appears in the
 constitutions of each of the 50 states, but we need only be concerned with the
 federal constitutional provisions. A state cannot violate individual rights
 protected by the federal constitution, although state laws may be more
 protective of individuals.8
 The simple words of the first amendment have been applied in a series of
 decisions of the United States Supreme Court to a wide range of expressive
 activities including such different human actions as nude dancing,4 the
 display of a sign of dissent on a jacket,5 wearing armbands,6 refusing to
 display a state motto imprinted on an automobile licence plate,7 burning a
 1 The first amendment reads in its entirety: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
 religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
 right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
 3 The pertinent portion of the fourteenth amendment is: "No State shall make or enforce any law which
 shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
 person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person, within its jurisdiction
 the equal protection of the laws/' The first amendment has been incorporated into the fourteenth. See Fiske
 v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927); Gitlow v. New York , 268 U.S. 652 (1925). States can afford greater
 protection to individual interests than commanded by the federal constitution. See Pruneyard Shopping
 Center v. Robins , 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
 4 See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975); also California v. LaRue , 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
 ' Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
 * Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District , 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
 * Wooley v. Maynard , 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
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 flag,8 advertising products9 or services10 for sale, giving money to political
 candidates,11 as well as ordinary speech,12 petition and assembly13 and
 publication.14 The interests protected by the first amendment have also been
 held to support constitutional protection for a limited right of association15
 and, to a certain extent, for a right of privacy.16 The protection has not been
 limited to individuals, but has also been extended to corporations.17 There
 has been some hesitation in applying the first amendment to expression
 manifested through action - unless it is within the "petition and assembly"
 clause - as opposed to speech, silence or writing.18 The distinction between
 speech and action is, however, of little concern in the context of academic
 freedom because what academics do is usually much more "speech" than
 "action". An exception might be a decision to pursue research, for valid
 scientific reasons, that would require additional laboratory construction.
 Although clearly related to rational inquiry, the laboratory construction
 would be "action" not "speech" and would not, in and of itself, qualify
 under current American law for constitutional protection as a form of
 expression.19
 Expressive actions which fit within the definitional framework may, how-
 ever, be subjected to some reasonable limitations. Parades and demonstra-
 tions may be limited by permit-requirements.20 Noise can be controlled even
 if it means shutting off a means of communication.21 Confidential matters
 relating to national security can be kept secret under pain of criminal
 penalty.22 A freely negotiated contract limiting one party's freedom of
 speech can be enforced.23 Criminal conspirators can be brought to justice on
 the basis of their own words in furtherance of the conspiracy.24 Thus, merely
 " Street v. New York , 394 U.S. 576 (1969). The conviction in this case was overturned because the act of
 burning a flag was so intertwined with speech that the act - setting a flag afire on a New York street
 corner- could not be separated from the speech involved.
 • Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. ,425 U.S. 748 (1976).
 10 Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
 11 Buckley v. Valeo , 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
 u But even this has not always been clear. See Linde, Hans, " 'Clear and Present Danger7 Reexamined:
 Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto", Stanford Law Review , XXII (June 1970), p. 1 163.
 " Edwards v. South Carolina , 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
 uNew York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
 u NAACP v. Alabama , 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
 11 Griswold v. Connecticut , 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
 17 First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti , 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
 M United States v. O'Brien , 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
 19 Anglo-American common law does, nevertheless, presume that a property owner may use his property
 as he sees fit so long as he does not harm others. The maxim, Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, was the
 guiding principle of much of the common law. See e.g. , Bohan v. The Port Jervis Gas Light Company , 122
 N.Y. 18, 25 N.E. 246, 9 L.R.A. 71 1 (N.Y. 1890). The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution and
 similar state constitutional provisions prohibit a taking of private property without just compensation. The
 destruction or limitation of a use may be a taking, although zoning laws, which do precisely that, have been
 upheld as constitutional. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
 " See Cox V.Louisiana [Cox I], 379 U.S. 536(1965) and Cox v. Louisiana [ Cox If] , 379 U.S. 559(1965).
 " See Kovacs v. Cooper , 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Saia v. New York , 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
 u See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Bickel, Alexander M., The
 Morality of Consent (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), pp. 79-81.
 * See e.g., Snepp v. United States , 444 U.S. 507 (1980); United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th
 Or.), cert, denied , 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
 ** See "Note: Conspiracy and the First Amendment , Yale Law Journal, LXXIX (June 1970), p. 872.
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 stating that a teacher or a student regularly engages in speech as part of his
 work does not mean that his speech is necessarily protected from all
 governmental regulation. Both the nature of the speech and the scope of the
 regulation in question have to be examined, often in a highly particular
 fashion.
 Issues concerning the expressive activities of university teachers and
 students arise in a number of varying contexts with significantly different
 legal consequences. These should be considered as they relate to the indi-
 vidual participants before moving to more complex associational and institu-
 tional concerns.
 Extracurricular Speech
 Outside the university, teachers and students are no different from any
 other citizens. Their speech and conduct are subject to all the protections
 and limitations applicable to the speech and conduct of all citizens, in so far
 as their direct relationships with the government are involved. But this has
 not always been so.
 The cases most relevant to the present inquiry are those involving
 attempts by an educational institution to discipline a teacher or student for
 statements made outside the university which are free from direct govern-
 mental control. In other words, may a university teacher be dismissed,
 demoted or reprimanded for saying or doing something outside the premises
 of his institution which he is free to do as a citizen but which may not be in
 accordance with the university authority's idea of conduct appropriate to a
 member of the university? Since the Constitution of the United States
 generally protects the individual from governmental interference, it cannot
 be invoked unless the institution is publicly supported or unless the particu-
 lar issue is connected with "state action".25
 One essential issue has significantly changed the judicial approach to this
 question. For some time the federal courts were of the opinion that public
 employment was a privilege which could be conditional on the surrender of
 some constitutional rights. This was particularly evident in Adler v. Board of
 Education ,26 a case sustaining the validity of New York's "Feinberg Law"27
 which precluded from public employment anyone who was a member of an
 organisation advocating the overthrow of the government "by force, viol-
 ence or any unlawful means". The United States Supreme Court said that
 "the school authorities have the right and the duty to screen the officials,
 teachers, and employees as to their fitness to maintain the integrity of the
 schools as a part of ordered society."28 Three members of the Supreme
 Court dissented but, of these, only Justice Douglas disagreed with the
 ** As to what constitutes "state action" in a university context, see Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School , 478
 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973); Robinson v. Davis, 447 F.2d 753 (4th Cir 1971); Coleman v. Wagner College , 429
 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970); Browns v. Mitchell , 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969).
 * 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
 17 1959 N.Y. Laws Ch. 360 (current version at N.Y. Educ. Law § 3022 (McKinney 1981)).
 * 342 U.S. at 493.
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 premise of the majority opinion that public employment could be condi-
 tional upon a limitation of rights available to citizens in general.29
 Since Adler , the Supreme Court has tended to follow the line of Justice
 Douglas' dissent. A public employee cannot be disciplined for engaging in
 acts which, as a private citizen, are subsumed under constitutionally pro-
 tected rights unless those acts directly affect the performance of his duties as
 a university teacher. For example, a school teacher cannot be dismissed for
 writing to a newspaper a letter critical of the educational authorities unless it
 can be shown that the letter contained statements known by the writer to be
 false and that its publication interfered with the operation of the school or
 the performance of the writer's duties as a teacher.30 In addition, the Sup-
 reme Court has construed public employment, once acquired, as a form of
 property which can be "taken" only through due process and for good cause,
 even though there is no requirement that the employment be granted in the
 first instance.31
 It still remains a question whether certain spoken expressions - perhaps
 protected for private citizens - might reflect so poorly on the speaker or his
 institution that disciplinary means would be justified. This is largely a factual
 issue to be decided case by case. The prevailing presumption, however, is
 that a scholar or student - or an administrator for that matter - retains his
 rights qua citizen when speaking or acting outside the institution. The
 burden is on the government to justify whatever disciplinary actions it takes
 without regard to the teacher's exercise of the rights of citizenship. There is
 the possibility, none the less, that certain spoken expressions, even though
 protected under the right of citizenship, might provide a ground for discipli-
 nary action. The degree to which "life-styles" and actions outside the
 institution and the classroom are thought to affect the teacher's professional
 performance varies greatly with the size of the community and the ages of
 the students with whom the particular teacher deals.
 The American concern about conspiratorial revolutionary activities and
 about the loyalty of the citizenry gave rise to several other cases which dealt
 with the general issue of speech outside the institution and the classroom.
 These cases gave occasion for the Supreme Court to consider the concept of
 academic freedom.
 During the same term of the Supreme Court in which the case o î Adler was
 decided, the Court overturned an Oklahoma statute32 which was quite
 similar to the "Feinberg law" of New York State. The distinction, according
 to the Supreme Court, was that the "Feinberg Law" required deliberate
 Ibid. , p. 496 (Black, J., dissenting, characterised the act as contrary to the policy of the first amendment);
 ibid., pp. 497-508 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting for procedural reasons); ibid., pp. 508-11 (Douglas, J.,
 dissenting).
 90 Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). See also, Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated
 School District , 439 U.S. 410 (1979); Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle , 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
 31 The nature of the contract and the presence or absence of permanent tenure do make a difference m
 determining what process is "due" and what reasons constitute sufficient justification. See Board of Regents
 v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann , 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
 M Oklahoma Statutes Annotated, Title 51, Section 37.1-8 (West. Supp. 1952) (repealed 1953).
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 and intentional membership in a subversive organisation, whereas the
 statute in Oklahoma punished innocent or unwitting membership. This was
 a rather fine distinction, but in the Court's view, the Oklahoma statute did
 not provide enough clarity to meet the requirements of due process.33
 Although it did not deal directly with the question of spoken expression by
 a teacher outside the academic institution, the case of Sweezy v. New
 Hampshire 34 was important in providing a perspective for this series of cases.
 During the 1950s the attorney-general of New Hampshire, at the behest of
 the state legislature, undertook an investigation of "subversives". Mr. Paul
 Sweezy, a well-known Marxist economist who was also a member of the
 Progressive party, was summoned by the attorney-general to answer ques-
 tions about his party and about a lecture he had given at the University of
 New Hampshire. He refused to answer, saying that the questions were
 irrelevant to the inquiry authorised by the legislature and that he was
 protected by the first amendment to the United States Constitution from
 being compelled to answer questions about his political beliefs. The state
 brought the case to court and obtained an order requiring him to answer. On
 appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the decision.
 Despite Mr. Sweezy's ultimate exoneration, the opinions of the Supreme
 Court were ambiguous about academic freedom. Chief Justice Earl Warren
 announced the result and wrote an opinion for a plurality of himself and
 Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan; the opinion recognised the impor-
 tance of academic freedom35 but it based the decision in Mr. Sweezy's favour
 on the failure of the prosecutor to prove that his powers under the statute
 extended to the inquiries which he addressed to Mr. Sweezy.38 The absence
 of sufficient statutory authority for the attorney-general's actions and con-
 cerns about the assurance of the due process of law, not the first amendment
 or academic freedom, saved Mr. Sweezy.
 Justice Felix Frankfurter, who was a professor at the Harvard University
 Law School prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court by President
 Roosevelt, concurred in the result but wrote a separate opinion, joined by
 Justice Harlan, in which he defended freedom of thought and inquiry from
 governmental restraint:
 Progress in the natural sciences is not remotely confined to findings made in the
 laboratory. Insights into the mysteries of nature are born of hypothesis and specula-
 tion. The more so is this true in the pursuit of understanding in the groping
 endeavors of what are called the social sciences, the concern of which is man and
 society. The problems that are the respective preoccupations of anthropology,
 economics, law, psychology, sociology and related areas of scholarship are merely
 departmentalized dealing, by way of manageable division of analysis, with inter-
 penetrating aspects of holistic perplexities. For society's good - if understanding be
 an essential need of society - inquiries into these problems, speculations about them,
 M Weiman v. Updegraff , 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
 34 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
 »¡bid., p. 250.
 -Ibid., pp. 253-55.
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 must be left as unfettered as possible. Political power must abstain from intrusion
 into this activity of freedom, pursued in the interest of wise government and the
 people's well-being, except for reasons that are exigent and obviously compelling.87
 Justice Frankfurter was able to persuade only one of his colleagues in the
 Supreme Court to join him in identifying academic freedom as the central
 issue in the case of Mr. Sweezy. Two justices were quite willing to see him
 held in contempt for refusing to answer38 and the four members of the
 plurality might well have agreed with the two dissenting justices if they had
 been persuaded that the statute had granted a sufficiently broad authority to
 the attorney-general of the state.
 The year following the decision in the case of Sweezy , the Supreme Court
 upheld the dismissal of a public school teacher named Beilan who refused to
 answer questions posed by the school superintendent about his alleged
 association with members of the Communist party.89 The Supreme Court
 was not swayed by his argument that questions about his political activities
 outside the school asked by an agent of the state with authority over his
 employment were an invasion of his freedom of thought and speech. Justices
 Frankfurter and Harlan joined the majority, apparently believing that their
 defence of Mr. Sweezy's refusal to answer questions was inapplicable to the
 case of the teacher in question. There were indeed differences between the
 two situations. Mr. Beilan was a secondary school teacher responsible for
 the education of adolescents, a setting in which the teacher has considerable
 authority and influence. Elementary and secondary schools which are under
 the jurisdiction of the state are charged not only with the transmission of
 knowledge but also with the inculcation of values thought important to the
 maintenance of a liberal-democratic society. Perhaps schools maintained by
 the state are not the place for committed communists,40 although there was
 no evidence that Mr. Beilan abused his position as a teacher in the school to
 promote his political views, whatever they might have been. Mr. Sweezy, on
 the other hand, was a guest lecturer at a university, where a wide variety of
 speakers address audiences usually made up of older and more mature
 persons. He was not a regular teacher at the University of New Hampshire
 and his audience was not subject to his recurrent authority. These differ-
 ences between the case of Mr. Beilan and Mr. Sweezy are not so great,
 however, that the case of Sweezy could be said to be inapposite to the other
 case, and they hardly justify the cavalier manner in which Mr. Beilan's
 arguments were dismissed.
 After the flurry of cases in the 1 950s, there was a lull for a decade until the
 "Feinberg Law" was again challenged before the United States Supreme
 Court in Keyishian v. Board of Regents: 41 The opinion in the case of Adler
 " Ibid., pp. 261-62 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
 " Justices Clark and Burton dissented. Ibid. , p. 267. Justice Whittaker took no part. Ibid. , p. 255.
 " Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
 40 Whether there is room for one in a state university as chairman of the department of government is a
 matter now under litigation. See OUman v. Toll , Civil Action No. 14-78-1402 now pending in the United
 States District Court for the District of Maryland.
 41 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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 was not overruled but it was certainly qualified. The "Feinberg Law" was
 found to be applicable only to knowing membership in and a specific intent
 to further the illegal aims of a group committed to the overthrow of the
 government by force.42 The majority also repudiated one of the most
 important premises of the decision in the Adler case by stating that public
 employment did not entail the surrender of rights which would be protected
 from direct governmental intrusion.48 Of some importance for the determi-
 nation of the legal status of academic freedom, a majority of the United
 States Supreme Court recognised for the first time that academic freedom is
 a separate, identifiable value entitled to legal protection.
 Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of
 transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That
 freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not
 tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.44
 In the same year, the United States Supreme Court also declared unconstitu-
 tional a statute of the state of Maryland requiring teachers to take a loyalty
 oath as a condition of employment 45 Justice Douglas, writing for the Sup-
 reme Court, noted that loyalty oaths were a form of continuing surveillance
 of political thought destructive of the teaching profession 46
 The conclusion which may be drawn from these cases is that a teacher, a
 scientist, or other employee of an educational institution is generally free to
 engage in activities outside his institution with the same protection as any
 other citizen. The degree to which he is subject to direct control by the state
 is largely unaffected by his status as a teacher or scientist. This principle
 applies primarily to employees of governmentally supported institutions
 because the United States Constitution provides little restraint on the
 actions of private institutions.47
 Speech on University Campuses but Outside Class-rooms
 To what extent may a governmentally supported institution control
 or suppress speech in public which is not connected with the regular
 teaching activities of the institution but which occurs on, or which is
 delivered from, the physical premises of the institution? Such activities
 cannot be legally suppressed by governmentally supported institutions,
 unless they are obscene, consist more of action than of speech, or constitute
 a serious threat to national security. They may, however, be subjected to
 reasonable limitations designed to maintain order and a modicum of disci-
 « Ibid., pp. 606-9.
 "Ibid., pp. 605-8.
 44 Ibid. , p. 603. The majority was a slim one. Justices Clark, Harlan, Stewart and White dissented. They saw
 the case not as one of free speech but as one of whether the state must employ someone who is committed to
 its overthrow. Ibid. , pp. 628-29.
 44 Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967).
 46 Ibid. , pp. 59-60.
 47 There are statutory limitations. As employers, as enterprises and as recipients of grants, universities are
 subject to a number of statutes and regulations affecting employment, student admissions and working
 conditions.
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 pline so that the institution can continue to function. The communicative
 activities may include lectures, debates or discussions, political comment, or
 even the act of joining an organisation; in short, the whole range of
 protected activities loosely defined as "expression".
 The "benchmark case" is the United States Supreme Court decision of
 1969 in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District.** Several
 students in a public school wore black armbands to school in silent protest
 against the Vietnam war. They were suspended; their challenge to the
 suspension eventually found its way to the United States Supreme Court.
 The suspensions were defended as necessary disciplinary procedures,
 because the armbands allegedly caused other students to react in a disrup-
 tive manner. There was no suggestion that the students who wore the
 armbands engaged in any unruly behaviour. Although the Supreme Court's
 opinion was historically inaccurate in its citation of precedent49 and poorly
 reasoned, it did establish clearly that the Constitution of the United States
 would protect the political expression of students - and by implication of
 teachers- on the premises of an educational institution even though the
 expression might not be related to the subjects under study and might be
 inconsistent with the views of the majority.
 Tinker was a logical next step from the decision rendered in 1943 in the
 case of West Virginia v. Barnette00 in which the Supreme Court ruled that a
 member of Jehovah's Witnesses could not be compelled to participate in a
 flag-saluting ceremony. The decision in the case of Barnette protected the
 integrity of an individual's conscience and recognised the importance of
 silence or non-participation in the self-expression of an individual. The
 decision in the Tinker case was the protection of an overt act of expression as
 distinguished from a refusal to act. In the one instance the state could not
 coerce participation; in the other, it could not compel silence, or its physical
 equivalent - removal of the armbands.51
 Private educational institutions have much greater legal authority to
 control speech on their premises than do public institutions. Ideally, private
 universities, colleges and schools should be equally appreciative of the
 freedom of speech. There may, however, often be a value in the cultural
 diversity of varying orthodoxies. The value of free expression in a university
 does not mean that Brigham Young University which is a Mormon institu-
 tion, should not, as an institution, operate in accordance with the principles
 of the Latter Day Saints Church or that Fordham University, as an institu-
 tion, should be indifferent to the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church.52
 4# 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
 49 The case oí Meyer was cited by the majority as one of free speech which it was not; this point was noted by
 Justice Black in his dissent. 393 U.S. at 519-21 (Black, J., dissenting).
 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette , 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
 " The decisions in both the Tinker and Barnette cases declare the freedom of the teacher to be subject to
 reasonable limitations. A teacher's freedom of expression as a citizen is not denied by a school dress code for
 teachers. East Hartford Education Association v. Board of Education of the Town of East Hartford , 562 F.2d
 838 (2d Cir. 1977). See also Brubaker v. Board of Education, 502 F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1974); Moore v. School
 Board of Gulf County, Florida , 364 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Fla. 1973).
 M On the values of diversity among institutions, see Gellhorn, Walter and Greenawalt, R. Kent, The
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Tue, 20 Jun 2017 03:47:57 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 528 Howard O . Hunter
 Constitutional Limitations on Governmental Control of Curriculum and
 Teaching: Primary and Secondary Schools
 Direct control by the state of curriculum and teaching methods in the
 United States varies greatly from state to state in the educational system.
 Much more control is exercised at the primary and secondary stages than in
 higher education, although the latter is far from completely free of interfer-
 ence by the state. The courts have, however, employed the United States
 Constitution to limit the degree of permissible direct interference by the
 state with the substance of what is taught and with teaching methods. Most
 of the cases have involved primary and secondary schools, but they provide
 an instructive background for a discussion of university problems.
 American schools supported from public revenues- called public schools
 in the United States - operate under the authority of thousands of separate
 local school boards. In every state there are a department of education and
 general rules of state-wide application which define standards of "accredita-
 tion", prescribe certain courses of instruction, establish various minimal
 qualifications for teachers and fix the ages of compulsory school-attendance.
 Within this framework, local authorities have considerable discretion.
 Teachers answer, through school administrators, to the local school board,
 which is usually an elective body. The taxes to be collected for educational
 expenditures, the quality of buildings, teachers' salaries, the selection of text
 books and approved extracurricular activities are all subject to the influence
 or direct control of these local boards.53 As a result, there may be very
 substantial differences among public schools from state to state, and even
 among districts within a single state. Controversies about curricular content
 or teaching methods usually occur between teachers and their immediate
 superiors within the school, or with the school board itself, rather than with
 state or federal authorities.
 For the most part courts have been reluctant to become embroiled in local
 disputes between teachers and school boards about proper teaching
 methods or the substance of courses of study. They have treated such
 matters as local problems susceptible to solutions through the proper appli-
 cation of ordinary principles of the law of contract or through the political
 process. A few federal judges have taken jurisdiction and turned a minor
 Sectarian College and the Public Purse, Fordham: A Case Study (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1970);
 Keeton, Morris, Models and Mavericks (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971); Pace, C. R., The Demise of
 Diversity (Berkeley: Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, 1974). On the danger of homogeneity
 resulting from regulations, see Kroll, David, "Title IX Sex Discrimination Regulations: Private Colleges and
 Academic Freedom", Urban Law Annual , XIII (1977), esp. p. 110, fn. 19.
 It is not a breach of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment for there to be gross
 disparities in school expenditures among districts nor is education a fundamental right guaranteed by the
 federal constitution. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez , 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Under state
 law a different result might follow. See Board of Education v. Nyquist , 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S. 2d 606
 (Sup. Ct. 197$); Horton v. Meskill , 172 Conn. 61 5, 376 A.2d 359 (1977); Olsen v. State, 276 Ore. 9, 554 P.2d
 139 (1976); Buse v. Smith , 74 Wis. 2d 550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487
 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). See also Serrano v. Priest [Serrano II], 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929,
 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1977).
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 dispute, such as the assignment of a short story by Kurt Vonnegut, into a
 matter of federal constitutional law.54
 Commentators, judges and teachers agree that the primary purpose of
 lower schools is to transmit a certain body of knowledge necessary for
 citizenship in a liberal-democratic society and for the pursuit of a useful
 vocation. There may be differences about how best to attain this goal and
 there may be indications that the American public schools have been unsuc-
 cessful in pursuing it, but there is a clear consensus about the goal itself.
 There is also agreement that the public schools should inculcate values
 necessary to good citizenship, but there is often disagreement about the
 particular value to be inculcated and what methods should be used to
 achieve this end. There is the fear that the inculcation of values may
 degenerate into ideological indoctrination,55 although there is always the
 counter-argument that failure to inculcate values implies the absence of
 values and encourages a hedonistic amorality.
 The courts, while generally reluctant to intervene, have declared that
 constitutional interests may be affected by decisions of school boards which
 define the content of particular courses too narrowly, which compel adher-
 ence to a particular viewpoint or which stringently control teachers' methods
 of teaching. The scope of this constitutional interest in the public schools is
 not clear, but it does provide some authority for limiting the imposition of
 the wilPof the majority which might suppress unpopular ideas - regardless of
 their truth - in the name of the values of the community as a whole.
 The most notable and significant cases have dealt with religious issues. In
 most SGhool districts the majority of citizens profess to be Christians, and far
 more often than not, Protestant Christians, so that the values of the majority
 in any school district are often distinctly those of Protestant Christianity. As
 agencies of the state, the local school boards are expressly prohibited from
 propagating any religious beliefs by the prohibition against the establish-
 ment of any particular religion provided in the first amendment to the
 United States Constitution. To this end the Supreme Court has prohibited
 school-sponsored religious activities,56 has invalidated a law prohibiting the
 study of evolution because it appeared to require the teaching of the Book of
 Genesis,57 has refused to allow any public expenditures for church schools
 except for secular services or programmes available generally to all similar
 institutions,58 and has permitted students to be excused from secular pro-
 grammes which are contrary to their own religious beliefs.59 Although what
 M Parducci v. Rutland , 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
 M See Van Alstyne, William, "The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors", Duke Law Journal,
 MCMLXX (October 1970) pp. 841 ff.; but compare Goldstein, Stephen R., "The Asserted Constitutional
 Right of Public School Teachers to Determine What They Teach", University of Pennsylvania Law Review,
 CXXIV (June 1976), pp. 1293 ff.
 M School District v. Schempp , 374 U.S. 203 (1953); Engel v. Vitale , 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
 w Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
 " See e.g. , Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Wheeler v. Barrera , 417 U.S. 402 (1974), judgment
 modified, A22 U.S. 1004 (1975); Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Everson v. Board of Education, 330
 U.S. 1 (1947).
 " West Virginia State Board of Education v. Bametie, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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 constitutes a religion or a genuine religious belief has not always been
 clear,60 the Constitution of the United States prohibits the teaching of
 religion, except as an academic subject, and compulsory participation in
 religious ceremonies.
 Several judicial decisions or opinions have gone further and asserted that
 the teaching methods of a teacher or the use of some teaching materials in
 addition to the prescribed texts may involve the exercise of constitutional
 rights. None has gone so far as to say that a teacher may simply abandon the
 syllabus and teach what he or she wants in any manner in which he or she
 wishes to teach it, but the Constitution does allow, at least implicitly, that the
 teacher be afforded a certain degree of pedagogical flexibility.61
 Normally, an issue of rights under the first amendment arises in connec-
 tion with limitation by a state of an individual citizen's speech or other
 expressive activities. The cases involving school teachers seem to touch on
 that same concern, but the judicial justifications for protecting the teacher
 who strays from the conventional path in the process of teaching have not
 been derived from his right, as an individual, to speak. Instead, the protec-
 tion afforded has been justified because imaginative teachers are important
 in education. One of the best examples of this rationale appears in the case of
 Mailloux v. Kiley decided by Judge Wyzanski of Massachusetts in 1971:
 In his teaching capacity he is not required to "guess what conduct or utterances may
 lose him his position. . . If he did not have the right to be warned before he was
 discharged, he might be more timid than it is in the public interest that he should be,
 and he might steer away from reasonable methods with which it is in the public
 interest to experiment.62
 In this passage, Judge Wyzanski was speaking of the rule of due process
 which requires that adequate prior notice be given of what constitutes
 prohibited conduct, having previously concluded that a teacher has a limited
 freedom to choose a teaching method with a "serious educational purpose"
 which is "relevant" to the subject matter.63 The ultimate justification for
 Judge Wyzanski's decision, in which he held in favour of a teacher who had
 been disciplined for the assignment of an article in The Atlantic Monthly
 which contained an obscene expression, was, however, based not on the
 teacher's right to speak but on the public interest in having creative teachers.
 A somewhat similar approach can be seen in cases which have dealt with
 pupils and their alleged "right to know". School board decisions about
 60 See e.g. , Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1 878); Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc. , 556 F.2d
 311 (5th Cir. 1977); Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967 ),rev'don other grounds, 395 U.S. 6
 (1969); Brown v. Pena , 441 F. Supp; 1392 (S.D. Fla. 1977); State v. Big Sheep, 75 Mont. 219, 243 P. 1067
 (1926); Llewellyn v. State , 489 P.2d 511 (Okla. 1971); People v. Woody , 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40
 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964); "Note: Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion," Harvard Law Review , XCI
 (March 1978), pp. 1056 ff.
 81 See e.g. , Cary Adams Arapahoe School District, All F. Supp. 945 (D. Colo. 1977), ajj d 598 1. ¿a 535
 (10th Cir. 1979); Mailloux v. Kiley , 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass. '91'),aff d per curiam, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st
 Cir; 1971); Keeps v. Geanakos , 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D.
 Ala! 1970).
 " 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Mass. 1971), affd per curiam 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971).
 "Ibid., p. 1391.
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 teaching methods, text book selections or deletions and library acquisitions
 or removals have resulted in several decisions holding, among other things,
 that pupils have a "right to know" or to receive information separate and
 apart from any right of their teachers to teach. The genesis of this "right" lies
 in two decisions which, carried to their logical conclusions, yield funda-
 mentally different results.
 The more recent and most often cited decision is in the case of Virginia
 State Board Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council Inc.** in which
 the Supreme Court struck down a Virginia statute which prohibited advertis-
 ing of the price of prescription drugs. The decision is most noteworthy for its
 reversal of an earlier decision holding "commercial speech" to be outside
 the protection of the first amendment,65 but the Court was faced with a
 delicate standing problem because the complainants were not the pharma-
 cists, who were the targets of the law; rather, they were consumers who
 argued that their interests in acquiring information about prices for purposes
 of shopping were denied. In order to reach the substantive issue of the
 validity of the statute, the Supreme Court first had to determine whether the
 petitioners had a legal ground for complaint. The Court did so by reasoning
 that the necessary corollary of a right to speak is the right of the speaker's
 audience to hear what he has to say. This rationale was repeated in subse-
 quent decisions which overturned prohibitions on advertising by lawyers66
 and the placement of "For Sale" signs on property.87 The "right to hear"
 declared in the case of Virginia Pharmacy was, however, merely the recip-
 rocal of a right to speak, and it provided no independent right to the listener
 as distinguished from the speaker's right of speech in a particular context.
 The much older decision in the case of Meyer v. Nebraska ,68 which is still
 relied upon, suggests an altogether different theoretical basis for the "right
 to know". The state of Nebraska had enacted a law which prohibited
 instruction in foreign languages to any student below the eighth grade. The
 avowed purpose of the statute was to promote cultural integration and a
 monolingual society because Nebraska had large numbers of European
 immigrants. Mr. Meyer was convicted of a misdemeanour for teaching
 German to a ten-year-old boy in a parochial school. The United States
 Supreme Court overturned the conviction and held the statute to be uncon-
 stitutional because it unreasonably interfered with Meyer's pursuit of a
 lawful occupation, with the freedom of the child's parents and Meyer to
 contract for his education, and with the child's own right to acquire informa-
 tion.69 Unlike the decision in the case of Virginia Pharmacy , the decision in
 the Meyer case was not grounded in a specific constitutional provision nor on
 an articulated right of individual expression. Instead, it was one of a series of
 84 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
 86 Valentine v. Chrestensen , 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
 " Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
 •' Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro , 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
 M 262 U.S. 390(1923).
 »Ibid., p. 401.
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 late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century decisions which developed
 what lawyers call "substantive due process" - the idea, often poorly or
 vaguely expressed, that there are rights and interests beyond those specifi-
 cally enumerated in the United States Constitution which are free from
 governmental control except for compelling reasons. The doctrine was
 employed most often to defeat governmental attempts to regulate and
 control economic activities,70 and the Supreme Court was severely criticised
 for this by progressives.71 The term became one of obloquy in many
 intellectual circles and as the outlook of the Court changed, the concept of
 "substantive due process" fell into desuetude. Since 1965, "substantive due
 process" has had something of a revival.72 The term, with the pejorative
 connotation it acquired a half-century ago, is generally avoided but the basic
 notion is clearly present in a number of recent judicial decisions.
 The freedom to learn described in Meyer was a right of the pupil which
 existed independently of any interest the teacher might have had in speaking
 or teaching. The state's method of interfering with the pupil's right was to
 limit the teacher's freedom to teach foreign languages, but the assertion of
 the pupil's right was not dependent upon nor simply the necessary reciprocal
 of a right the teacher might have had. It does not follow that the state must
 provide a child - or anyone else - with the means of education73 nor that the
 state must allow free access to any property or information which it may
 possess.74 But the state may not, if the decision in the case of Meyer means
 what it says, unreasonably impede a pupil in his pursuit of knowledge, and
 the impediment may be challenged even if it does not have the effect of
 interfering with the expressive rights of anyone else. Some courts have
 carried the argument somewhat further and have said that if the state
 chooses to provide a service, such as a school library, which the Constitution
 does not require it to provide, the state may not subsequently limit access to
 the service without violating the Constitution unless there are compelling
 reasons.75 The state's action, by this rationale, can create a vested right of
 70 The high-water mark of "substantive due process" came in the case of Lochner v. New Yorky 198 U.S. 45
 (1905) in which the Supreme Court overturned a New York statute limiting the working hours of bakers
 because, in the Court's opinion, the law unconstitutionally interfered with the bakers' freedom of contract.
 71 See e.g., Isaacs, Nathan, "The Standardizing of Contracts," Yale Law Journal, XXVII (November 1917),
 pp. 34 ff.; Pound, Roscoe, "Liberty of Contract", Yale Law Journal, XVIII (May 1909), pp. 454 ff.
 71 See Ely, J. H., "The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade", Yale Law Journal, LXXXU
 (April 1973), pp. 920 ff. "Developments in the Law- The Constitution and the Family", Harvard Law
 Review, XCIII (April 1980), pp. 1156 ff.
 73 San Antonio Independent School District v .Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In his dissent, Justice Brennan
 argued that a right to education could be developed from the necessary relationship of education to the
 exercise of clearly protected rights such as the right to vote or to speak. Ibid. , pp. 62-63 (Brennan, J.,
 dissenting).
 74 See e.g., Houchins v. KQED , 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Pell v. Procunier , 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v.
 Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
 75 Minar ani v. Strongsviue City School District, 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1977); òalvau v. Nashua Board of
 Education , 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1971); Right to Read Defense Committee of Chelsea v. School
 Committee of the City of Chelsea, 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978); Contra, President's Council, District 25
 v. Community School Board No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1972); Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School,
 475 F. Supp. 615 (D. Vt. 1979); Pico v. Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District , 474 F.
 Supp. 387 (E.D.N. Y. 1979), rev'd, 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980), affd, - U.S. -, 102 S, Ct. 2799
 (1981); see also Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corporation, 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980).
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 access akin to a property right justified by reference to the generalised "right
 to know". Although this rationale has thus far been applied only in cases
 involving decisions to remove books from an approved list of text books or
 to remove books or periodicals from a library, it should be equally applicable
 to changes in curriculum or even to changes in teaching staff.
 If these cases are examined together, what do they tell us about the role of
 the Constitution in questions of freedom in the curriculum and in teaching in
 the lower and intermediate schools? First, consistently with the cases involv-
 ing extra-curricular expressive activities and speech outside the curriculum
 but within the school, the courts recognise rights of dissent and a certain
 freedom from compulsory participation. A Roman Catholic pupil might, for
 instance, be excused from classes on birth control. An offhand remark or a
 slight variation in teaching methods might also be protected. The courts
 have steadfastly refused to recognise any comprehensive constitutional right
 for a teacher to be an individual arbiter of curricular content or teaching
 methods. They have consistently deferred such decisions to the local
 authorities and where they have intervened, it has generally been to protect
 a teacher from an apparently arbitrary or particularly harsh punishment for
 a minor deviation from the prescribed regimen.
 With regard to the lower and middle public schools, this attitude has been
 reasonable. Teachers usually control a class-room. Their pupils are usually
 all minors who have not, by legal definition, attained the level of full
 citizenship in a democratic society. They are not bereft of legal rights, but
 they are not allowed to vote; they can be prevented from purchasing certain
 reading matter that is freely available to adults; they are not subject to the
 same sanctions of the criminal law; and they lack the capacity to enter into
 contracts. They are a captive audience before a more sophisticated, more
 knowledgeable teacher who can grant them good or bad marks, discipline
 them and make recommendations that will affect their future. The teacher,
 moreover, is a paid employee appointed to teach a specified subject. The
 speech he utters in the class-room is the performance of his contractual
 obligation; it is not simply the expression of his own beliefs. The secondary
 school class-room is not a salon in which men and women of equal capacities
 engage in a dialogue of truth-seeking. Rather, it is a limited environment in
 which an adult tries to transmit knowledge and the methods of acquiring
 more knowledge to a group of children. To argue that a teacher, as an
 individual citizen, has a constitutional right to teach what he wants, in the
 manner he wants to teach it, is to misunderstand the responsibility of
 educators and the interests and responsibilities of elected officials, taxpayers
 and parents.
 On the other hand, the arguments claiming that pupils have a "right to
 know" and justifying particular actions of teachers by reference to the
 "public interest" in "creative teaching" lead almost necessarily to a concep-
 tion of education as a "public utility". This does have a certain superficial
 appeal. Schools are supported by public revenues and are intended to
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 produce an educated citizenry. Pupils should be exposed to balanced
 presentations of subjects and various evaluative standpoints should be given
 "equal time". This view is a reasonable one if espoused with moderation,
 and it probably is accepted by most school boards. As a matter of constitu-
 tional law, however, it makes no sense, for it could be used to require the
 presentation of matters of questionable scientific worth and to require a
 homogeneity ultimately destructive of individual judgement and initiative.
 In so far as universities are concerned, the attribution of the status of a public
 utility to educational institutions at levels of the lower and middle schools
 provides a very inappropriate criterion for passing judgement on univer-
 sities where criteria of intellectual achievement by individuals are of crucial
 importance.
 Direct Control of Curriculum and Teaching by Government: Colleges and
 Universities
 There has been little direct governmental intrusion into internal institu-
 tional decisions about the substance of courses of study and teaching
 methods. Almost invariably, legislators and regulatory officials have defer-
 red to the judgement of university teachers and administrators in such
 matters although there have been flurries of interest. During the 1950s there
 was concern about subversive influences in colleges and universities.76 The
 student disturbances of the 1960s brought forth various demands for direct
 controls by legislatures on universities which if enacted, might have had an
 impact on the content and methods of teaching. For the most part, however,
 the internal affairs of universities settled down before the passage of any
 significantly intrusive legislation.77
 A good example of judicial reluctance to intervene is a decision of the
 Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1973 in the case oiHetrick v. Martin.16 The
 complainant was a young teacher of English at a modest midwestern state
 university. Her contract was not renewed and she claimed that the reasons
 for non-renewal were her use of somewhat different teaching methods and
 occasional class-room references to materials outside the prescribed syl-
 labus. The administration of the university responded by saying that her
 pupils were relatively unsophisticated and that the prescribed syllabus
 should be followed closely, especially by novices in teaching, in order to
 provide the students with a sound basis in English. Furthermore, the admini-
 stration said that the complaining teacher did not complete her doctoral
 dissertation on schedule and only covered about half the material required
 7# See e.g. , Sweezy v. New Hampshire , 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Slochower v. Board of Higher Education , 350
 U.S. 551 (1956); Morris, A. A., "Academic Freedom and Loyalty Oaths", Law and Contemporary
 Problems , XXVIII (Summer 1963), pp. 487 ff. O rentlicher, Herman, "Repealing the Disclaimer Affidavit",
 American Association of University Professors Bulletin , XL VI (1960), pp. 55 ff.; Van den Haag, Ernest,
 "Academic Freedom in the United States", Law and Contemporary Problems , XXVIII (Summer 1963), pp.
 515 ff.
 77 See generally, "Comment: Aid to Education, Student Unrest and Cutoff Legislation: An Overview",
 University of Pennsylvania Law Review , CXIX (May 1971), pp. 1003 ff.
 7B 480 F.2d 705 (6th Cir.), cert, denied , 414 U.S. 1075 (1973).
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 by the syllabus. In rejecting the teacher's complaint, the Circuit Court of
 Appeals said:
 Plaintiff would thus have us convert the vague, inclusive term "teaching methods"
 into a specific protected form of speech that cannot be considered by a school
 administration in determining whether a nontenured teacher should be renewed. In
 effect, plaintiff would have us substitute the First Amendment for tenure, and would
 thereby succeed in elevating contract law to constitutional status.79
 Although the reasons advanced by the judges for being reluctant to review
 academic decisions were sensible, it must not be overlooked that the em-
 ployer in the case oiHetrick was a state university. As such, it was an agency
 of the state just as much as a court. Its decisions, which might perhaps be
 tainted by political considerations on the part of the state educational
 hierarchy, could be as inimical to academic freedom as the actions of other
 state agencies. Deference to the autonomy of universities does not automat-
 ically guarantee complete academic freedom for individual teachers. Thus,
 the basis for the complaint in the case of Hetrick, although unsupported by
 the facts, was not without merit. The complainant's legal arguments were
 soundly grounded in the theories and supporting cases forbidding dismissal
 for constitutionally protected activities and recognising a "property-
 interest" in public employment.80
 Perhaps the greatest direct intrusion into the substance of the syllabus and
 of courses of study in universities occurs in licensing requirements for certain
 professions. To become certified as a physician, lawyer, dentist, pharmacist,
 architect or engineer - at least in certain categories - an individual must
 usually pass an examination and meet certain minimal educational require-
 ments. To be certified in one of the learned professions, an applicant often
 must have been graduated from an institution accredited by the state or by
 some professional organisation, such as the American Bar Association,
 recognised by the state as a qualified "accrediting" body. Standards of
 "accreditation" differ among states and professions but they invariably
 involve judgements by an external body about appropriate syllabuses,
 courses of study, ratios of students to teachers, libraries, physical facilities,
 and academic standards. Some states have gone so far as to prescribe certain
 courses for students in professional schools. Two states, South Carolina81
 and Indiana,82 have recently promulgated rules requiring persons who apply
 to practise law in those states to have taken a lengthy list of specified courses
 in law schools, thus eliminating much of the freedom of teachers and
 students.
 79 Ibid., p. 709.
 90 Some courts have gone so far as to require that permanent tenure be granted as a remedy for the
 violation of a statutory or constitutional right. See Kunda v. Muhlenberg College , 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.
 1980); Johnson v. Butler, 433 F. Supp. 531 (W.D. Va. 1977); "Note: Tenure and Partnership as Title VII
 Remedies", Harvard Law Review , XCIV (December 1980), pp. 457 ff. Recently, a federal appeals court
 ruled that a partnership is a voluntary association and that denial of membership in a partnership is not a
 violation of the civil rights statute requiring equal employment opportunities. Hishon v. King and Spalding ,
 678 F.2d 1022 (11th Cir. 1982).
 •* Rule 5 A, South Carolina Rules of Court. (1980).
 81 Indiana Rules of Admission and Discipline 13. (1978).
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 The South Carolina and Indiana regulations are unusual in their specifi-
 city. They are expressions of concern about the competence of lawyers. The
 complaints are overstated, although there is some truth in them, but the
 dangers of such direct external control are apparent and should be resisted.
 The more insidious forms of control are exercised through the "accrediting"
 bodies which are often much influenced by the institutions they are sup-
 posed to assess. They help to discredit institutions of questionable quality,
 but they also tend to impose uniformity.82
 There is no significant body of case law about the constitutional status of
 "accreditation" and the requirements for the professions. This may partly be
 a consequence of the immunity thus far of individual scholars or teachers
 from any consequences of these intrusions. Lernfreiheit and Lehrfreiheit are,
 however, directly affected by rules such as those of the state of South
 Carolina regarding legal education. They are an unreasonable invasion of
 the individual scholar's freedom to teach, the university's control over its
 own curriculum, and the student's right to pursue his own intellectual
 interests.
 Indirect Intrusions into Curriculum and Teaching: Higher Education
 By far the most significant conflicts between universities and the state have
 developed in connection with the execution of various social policies having
 little or no connection with the pursuit of learning and with shifts in national
 science policies. Governmental powers over universities derive from finan-
 cial provision, whether in the form of almost total support from public
 revenues as in the case of state universities or in the form of grants for
 research and tuition fees to institutions, teachers and students. Governments
 also exercise powers over the university through legislation which is applicable
 to a class of organisations far broader than universities.
 American state governments have long had some control over the state
 universities which they support more or less fully, but the increasing
 activity of the federal government in the financial support of higher educa-
 tion has brought an enormous number of federal regulations promulgated
 by civil servants with congressional authority or through the use of the
 government's contracting power. In the former instance, proposed regula-
 tions are published and there is an opportunity to object to them before they
 M Oral Roberts University established a law school a few years ago and during the academic year of
 1980-81 it was reviewed by the American Bar Association for "accreditation". The review committee found
 that the school met all basic requirements but disapproved its application for accreditation because the law
 school requires both teachers and students to affirm their Christianity before appointment or admission.
 Classes are also often opened with a prayer. All of this is consistent with the university's adherence to
 fundamentalist, evangelical Christianity. The university challenged the disapproval in federal court alleging
 that the basis for the denial of accreditation amounted to an interference with the free exercise of religion.
 The university is entirely private and the American Bar Association acts as a quasi-state agency in its
 accreditation procedures. Without approval, Oral Roberts graduates would not be allowed to sit for
 examinations for admission to the bar in most states. The federal court recently enjoined the American Bar
 Association from denying accreditation for the reason of the university's religious policies. A Jew York Times ,
 19 July, 1981. See also, Kaplin, W. A. and Hunter, J. P., "The Legal Status of the Educational Accrediting
 Agency: Problems in Judicial Supervision and Governmental Regulation", Cornell Law Quarterly , LII (Fall
 1966), pp. 104 ff.
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 become final. As a party to a contract, however, the government can usually
 operate in an even more imperious way. Recipients of federal funds in the
 United States are now prohibited from discriminating on grounds of race,
 sex, national origin, religion, physical condition or age with only a few
 narrowly defined exceptions. The avoidance of discrimination has become
 insufficient. There must now be "affirmative action", which often entails the
 very discrimination which the legislation was intended to curb.84
 Universities are employers of many persons other than those performing
 academic or scientific work. The law treats universities the same as it treats
 any other employer of similar size. They are subject to laws regarding
 labour, safety and health and "equal employment opportunity". The argu-
 ment that universities are not profit-making enterprises has been disre-
 garded.85 The courts, and even the regulators, have sometimes recognised
 that the search for a highly qualified scientist in a field like molecular biology
 is not the same as the search for a typist or animal custodian. The Supreme
 Court has recently held that the members of the teaching staff of Yeshiva
 University are part of "management" and that, therefore, their union is not
 a labour union as defined by federal law.86
 There are statutes which control directly the freedom of the university and
 its members to disclose information about students or certain research
 activities.87 These do not intrude immediately into academic work but they
 do insert the government into the university.88 Other laws require the
 universities to disclose information traditionally regarded as confidential,
 such as the salaries of particular teachers.80 Governments impose various
 regulations on educational institutions as conditions for the maintenance of
 their exemption from taxation.90 The government also imposes onerous
 cost-accounting procedures on recipients of grants.91
 The modern American university and its individual members are now
 subjected to an extraordinary range and variety of laws, rules and regula-
 tions which affect virtually every activity of the university. These increase
 direct and indirect costs by requiring the detailed attention of many persons
 who must be employed especially for the purpose of meeting the govern-
 ment's requirements and by taking up the time of many who have other
 84 On affirmative action, see Eastland, Terry and Bennett, William J., Counting by Race (New York: Basic
 Books, 1979); Glazer, Nathan, A /firmati ve Discrimination : Ethnic Inequality and Public Policy (New York:
 Basic Books, 1975).
 45 An interesting debate is contained in Gellhorn, Ernest and Beyer, B. B., "The Academy as a Regulated
 Industry", in Hobbs, W. C. (ed.), Government Regulation of Higher Education^ Cambridge, Mass.:
 Ballinger, 1978), pp. 26 ff. and Fishbein, E. A., "The Academic Industry- A Dangerous Premise", in ibid. ,
 pp. 57 ff.
 00 National Labor Relations Board v. Yeshiva University , 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
 87 See The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1 974, United States Code, Title 20, Sections
 1232g-1232i (1976) and The Privacy Act of 1974, United States Code, Title 5, Section 552a (1976).
 88 See generally, Hunter, H. O., "Federal Antibias Legislation and Academic Freedom: Some Problems
 With Enforcement Procedures", Emory Law Journal, XXVII (Fall 1978), pp. 648-670.
 n See, e.g., Virginia Code Section 2.1-342 (Cumulative Supplement 1981); Wyoming Statutes Anno-
 tated, Sections 9-9-101, et seq. (1977).
 90 See Internal Revenue Code, Section 501 (c) and accompanying regulations.
 •' See Code of Federal Regulations, Title 45, Part 74, Subparts B, H, K; Sections 100a. 700-755 (1981).
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 tasks. Do these regulations affect the freedom of teachers to teach their
 subjects as they think most appropriate with due respect to university and
 disciplinary traditions? If they do, what has been the constitutional standing
 of such intrusions?
 The decisions involving secondary school teachers indicate that American
 courts have been willing to afford at least a limited constitutional protection
 to choice of teaching method. The extension of that protection to college and
 university teachers certainly seems justified. The age of the students, their
 level of sophistication, and their relatively greater freedom to choose
 teachers and courses all combine to suggest that the freedom assured to a
 university teacher should be greater than that of a secondary school teacher.
 Students are not compelled to be students nor are they compelled to remain
 in any given course of study or instruction. There are no significant cases in
 which the courts have accepted restrictions in the reasonable right of
 teachers to interpret their subject-matter and to present it as they have
 thought appropriate within the limits of the specification of their terms of
 appointment and the traditions of their disciplines.
 The determination of syllabuses and courses of study has traditionally
 been a departmental responsibility and not a matter left to individual
 teachers. This has been widely accepted. The absence of direct legislative
 intrusion has been reflected in the general refusal of courts to interfere with
 professional decisions in these matters.
 Constitutional questions tend to develop from the application of current
 regulations. This can be illustrated by a question that could be of significant
 scientific interest. To what extent do genetic differences between men and
 women affect their relative abilities to perform various physical or intellec-
 tual tasks? A teacher in a course on heredity who suggests that there may be
 reason to believe that men and women perform certain tasks differently by
 reason of their genes rather than by reason of culture, runs the risk of being
 accused of sexual bias in his teaching. If a student lodges a formal complaint
 with the United States Department of Education, the government, availing
 itself of the applicable procedures, becomes an advocate of the accuser and
 can threaten the institution with a termination of federal grants unless the
 teacher and his institution prove themselves to be innocent of the charge.
 Unlike the defendant in a criminal charge, the burden of proof is on the
 accused teacher, not on the government. A teacher accused of sexual bias by
 a student may thus find himself in the unpleasant position of being the
 defendant in an inquiry conducted with the full power of the federal
 government, and of being an irritant to his own university which must defend
 itself from a possible withholding of funds. A teacher who is aware of all that
 can follow from such an allegation may be hesitant to discuss a wide range of
 controversial topics.92
 M If a causal connection can be made out, the inhibition of such a teacher may develop into a "chilling
 effect'* strong enough to suggest a problem with the first amendment. Although not expressly prohibiting any
 particular assertion of belief, a governmental regulation which has the effect of inducing substantial
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 The United States Constitution, without question, protects the right of a
 citizen to be "biased". Subject to reasonable limitations as to time, place and
 manner, a "biased" citizen can speak or write about his biases. So long as the
 quality of his teaching and research are not affected, a teacher can be equally
 free in the expression of his views on all sorts of subjects. In his teaching he
 is, however, constrained by traditional requirements of relevance to the task
 at hand, by respect for standards of truthfulness and by the obligation of
 courteous conduct. Is a teacher who, regardless of his own beliefs, mentions
 arguments and works that contradict prevailing notions of equality to be
 subjected to sanctions because of that? There have been persons in the
 United States who have claimed that the freedom of intellectual expression
 must be balanced by considerations of fraternity and equality. They say that
 the former should defer to the latter when the exercise of the former would
 make more difficult the achievement of the latter.93 The truth of the expres-
 sion, or its possible importance in the search for truth are of no consequence
 in this argument - only its likely impact on declared goals of social justice
 and equality. This attitude is implicit in many submissions to conformity
 which are conditions of governmental support. The Supreme Court has only
 indirectly addressed this issue. In the case of Epperson v. Arkansas ,M the
 Supreme Court struck down an Arkansas law which made it a criminal
 offence for anyone in a public school, college or university to teach that
 mankind ascended or descended from a lower order of animals. The
 rationale of the majority of the Court was that the statute made the literal
 teaching of Genesis mandatory and that the law therefore violated the
 separation of state and church required by the first amendment.95 Justice
 Stewart's concurring opinion, however, focused almost directly on the
 argument that the central issue was the teacher's right to speak. The state
 could legitimately decide, for instance, that a certain subject might not be
 included in the syllabus, but it could not punish a teacher who made his
 students aware of the existence of a body of knowledge outside the cur-
 riculum or perhaps contrary to the approved syllabus.
 It is one thing for a state to determine that the:
 subject of higher mathematics, or astronomy, or biology shall or shall not be
 included in its public school curriculum. It is quite another thing for a State to make it
 a criminal offence for a public school teacher so much as to mention the very
 existence of an entire system of respected human thought. That kind of criminal law,
 I think, would clearly impinge upon the guarantees of free communication contained
 in the First Amendment . . .96
 self-censorship may be characterised as an impermissible prior restraint. See, Hunter, H. O., "Toward A
 Better Understanding of the Prior Restraint Doctrine: A Reply to Professor Mayton", Cornell Law Review ,
 LXVII (January 1982), pp. 283 ff. and Blasi, Vincent, "Toward A Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central
 Linkage", Minnesota Law Review , LXVI (May 1981), pp. 11 ff.
 •* See, e.g. , Committee on Freedom of Expression at Yale, "Report", Human Rights, IV (1975), p. 379.
 See also Marcuse, Herbert, "Repressive Tolerance", in Wolff, Robert Paul, Moore, Barrington and
 Marcuse, Herbert, A Critique of Pure Tolerance (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965), p. 81.
 "393 U.S. 97(1968).
 n Ibid., p. 103.
 ** Ibid., p. 116 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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 One of the defects of the statute at issue in the case of Epperson was its
 inherent vagueness. This is reflected in the opinion of Justice Stewart, and it
 is a difficulty characteristic of many governmental attempts to define the
 limits of acceptable speech in varying contexts. American courts have over-
 turned a number of ordinances, statutes and regulations which have been
 found to be ambiguous or too broad because they tend to have a "chilling
 effect" on speech. A restriction that is not narrowly circumscribed may
 inhibit speech which is outside the area sought to be regulated.97
 Existing American case law thus provides at least a limited basis for
 arguing that the application of various regulations may have an impermiss-
 ible "chilling effect" on a university teacher's readiness to speak the truth as
 he sees it, not only outside but also inside the class-room. This argument may
 not support an action to have a regulation declared unconstitutional, ab
 initio , but it can provide a powerful weapon of defence against the applica-
 tion of such a regulation in a particular instance. At the same time, it also
 supports an argument to amend procedures so that the person who is the
 object of a regulatory complaint does not bear the burden of proving his own
 innocence. It is contrary to academic freedom, and probably unconstitu-
 tional, for the state to punish a teacher for speaking what seems to him to be
 the truth based on sound research, even though that truth may be distasteful
 or may call into question the policies of the state or beliefs prevailing in the
 wider public.
 Research
 Direct control of research by government occurs mostly through decisions
 about financial support. Policies regarding financial support shift from time
 to time, and there are often political demands for the support of research
 activities likely to produce results of practical utility. The history of govern-
 mental support for research, especially in universities, despite occasionally
 rapid shifts in areas of interest, has, however, been one of self-restraint.
 There has been little direct intrusion into research activities once begun, and
 the awards of grants have usually been based on merit as assessed by those
 who are professional peers of applicants, rather than on social or political
 grounds. The most esteemed and generally most creative centres of research
 have received the bulk of the research awards made by the federal govern-
 ment.98 The relative restraint of the government and its respect for assess-
 ments made by panels of qualified scientists does, however, have an inherent
 weakness.
 The dominant feature of the federal research enterprise- in contrast to federal
 student aid - has been its ability to resist populist tendencies and to confine most of
 97 See, e.g. , Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction , 368 U.S. 278
 (1961); Karst, Kenneth, "Equality As a Central Principle of the First Amendment", University of Chicago
 Law Review , XL1II (Fall 1975), p. 38; "Note: The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine", Harvard Law
 Review , LXXXIII (February 1970), pp. 844 ff.
 98 See Smith, Bruce and Karlesky, J., The Universities in the Nation's Research Effort (New Rochelle:
 Change Magazine Press, 1977).
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 the funds to elite institutions by means of meritocratic practices. This may foster
 sound research, but it hardly makes for widespread popularity, and the unsteady
 course of federal support for scientific research in recent years may be explained in
 part by the small constituency for such services."
 A refusal to award a grant for research does not provide any ground for
 legal complaint by the rejected applicant as long as fair procedures have
 been used. A denial based on the applicant's expression of political or social
 views unrelated to the substance of the research for which he seeks support
 would offer a ground for complaint.
 Once a grant has been made, the recipient has a "property-interest" in the
 award of which he can be divested only through the application of due
 process and for reasons which do not infringe upon individual constitutional
 rights.100 The recipient must comply with the terms of his contract and this
 usually includes the full panoply of federal regulatory controls. Two prob-
 lems appear regularly in the administration of grants which can raise ques-
 tions of a constitutional sort. There are onerous and detailed reporting
 requirements intended to enstire proper control of expenditures. There may
 also be limitations on what is to be done with the scientific results of the
 research either in progress or on the completion of the project.
 The newest regulations regarding cost-accounting show a fundamental
 misunderstanding by the government about how research is done. Scientists
 and scholars do not work a 40-hour week in offices where they punch
 time-clocks. The independence and discretion of the scientist's and scholar's
 use of their time are critical to the nature of their work, but it does not
 correspond to the mode of work for which time-clocks were designed. The
 demands for information required by these governmental procedures may
 be regarded as unreasonable invasions of privacy. Let us suppose that a
 grant recipient is required to answer: "What portion of the grant represents
 income to you, and what proportion of your annual income does this
 represent?" The first part of the question is reasonable; the second part
 would be an impermissible invasion of privacy. A grant recipient's total
 income is of no relevance to the administration of a grant for research and
 the National Science Foundation is not empowered to conduct auditing
 activities for the Internal Revenue Service. The propriety or legality of a
 question designed to determine what a scientist does with his leisure time or
 what use he makes of his home would also be subject to reasonable dispute.
 The law of privacy is by no means highly developed, but it is clear that
 certain areas of a person's life - physical spaces, such as home or auto-
 mobile,101 and personal activities, such as marriage, child-bearing, child-
 99 Finn, Chester E., Jr., Scholars, Dollars and Bureaucrats (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1978),
 p. 114.
 100 See Monaghan, H. P., "Of 'Liberty' and 'Property' Cornell Law Review , LXII (January 1977),
 pp. 405 ff.; Van Alstyne, William, "Cracks in 'The New Property': Adjudicative Due Process in the
 Administrative State", Ibid. , p. 445.
 101 See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); Katz v.
 United States , 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see also United States v. Ross, - U.S. - , 50 U.S. Law Week, 4580 (1
 June, 1982).
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 rearing, reading,102- are protected from intrusion by the state or by other
 persons.103 The recipient of a grant does not lose this protection on the award
 of a grant except in so far as actual administration of the grant is concerned.
 The government cannot gain entrance into the private life of a person simply
 by its approval of the award of a grant for research.
 Some grants may contain limitations on the publication or disclosure of
 scientific results by the recipient. Such limitations may well be justified in
 connection with scientific data of possible application in defence or other-
 wise of significance to national security. Restrictions on publication or
 disclosure may be interpreted as prior restraint on speech and as such must
 be carefully scrutinised. The Supreme Court has consistently been reluctant
 to approve of any form of prior censorship.104
 Recipients of grants may have either of two fundamentally different
 relationships with the government. In one, the research worker is a govern-
 ment employee; in the other, he is an independent contractor. An employer
 usually owns the results of the research of an employee. A process, product,
 idea or theory is not the property of the employee to disclose to others or to
 use for his own profit. Thus when the government is an employer, it can
 strictly control the dissemination of the results obtained by employees who
 are research workers. This applies to all scientists who are employed by state
 universities. A scientist is certainly not precluded from speaking about his
 theories or writing about his research, but he can be prohibited from
 misappropriating proprietary information developed during the course of
 his university work.
 Intrusion into the work of independent contractors is a different matter
 altogether. The contract can provide that the results of the research be
 turned over to the government, and that, as a matter of the law of property,
 any products, processes, "know-how" or the like shall be the property of the
 government. Whereas an employer owns the information produced by a
 research worker whom he employs, a contractor may control the dissemina-
 tion of scientific research if the contract limits disclosure by the scientists,
 but he does not own the information. Therefore, unless the contract clearly
 specifies otherwise, a scientist who is legally a contractor is free to discuss, to
 publish and to profit from the results of his research. Such a scientist may,
 however, be an employee of a private university and the institution, as
 employer, may have a property interest in the fruits of his research.
 102 See e.g., Roe v. Wade , 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird , 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Loving v.
 Virginia , 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut , 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma , 316 U.S.
 535 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
 108 By both statute and common law, there is a generally recognised right of action in tort for an invasion of
 privacy as well as a right of ordinary trespass action for a physical intrusion. See generally, Hill, Alfred,
 "Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment", Columbia Law Review , LXXVI (December 1976),
 pp. 1253-1313; Prosser, William A., "Privacy", California Law Review , XLVIII (August 1960), pp. 383 ff.
 104 See e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States , 403 U.S. 713 (1971). See also United States v.
 Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W. D. Wis. 1979) (preliminary injunction against publication of an
 article providing details of a method for building a hydrogen bomb granted), request for writ of mandamus
 denied sub nom. Morland v. Sprecher, 443 U.S. 709 (1979), case dismissed as moot, Nos. 79-1428, 79-1664
 (7th Cir. Oct 1, 1979).
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 Privacy
 There are certain kinds of scholarly works which do touch on privacy and
 which may be subjected to inappropriate governmental regulations. Thus, a
 scholar may wish to maintain the confidentiality of his own sources of
 information for a research project. Can the government constitutionally
 compel him to disclose his sources and, if so, under what circumstances and
 for what reasons? The answer is unclear.
 The closest parallel is with a newspaper reporter who wants to maintain
 the confidentiality of his sources. There is no absolute privilege of confi-
 dence, but American courts have generally held that a reporter need not
 disclose his sources unless there is a showing of a compelling need and an
 absence of alternative means for acquiring the information.105 A reporter
 may be required, for instance, to identify his sources before a grand jury
 whose proceedings are themselves secret,106 but not in a pre-trial deposition
 in a civil action unless there is no other way to obtain the information and it is
 critical to the case.107 Even the constitutional right of a criminal defendant to
 call witnesses in his defence will not always require the compulsory dis-
 closure of confidential sources without a clear demonstration of relevance,
 and unavailability from other witnesses.108 The constitutional ground for this
 protection of reporters lies in the first amendment. The rights of the press
 generally have been derived from the central concepts of free speech. The
 printing press simply provides a mechanism - as do wireless and televi-
 sion - for the widespread dissemination of the spoken or written word.
 Allowing journalists to withhold information removes a possible impedi-
 ment to their inquiries, thus fostering a journalist's own interest in acquiring
 and disseminating information.
 Precisely the same reasoning can be applied to a scholar in a university.
 The compulsory disclosure of confidential sources can hamper scholarly
 work. There has even been some grudging judicial acceptance of this
 notion.109 There are unlikely to be many cases of this sort, for the simple
 reason that confidential sources are not as critical to academic scholars as
 they are to journalists.
 The status of the privacy of academic proceedings is at issue in connection
 with a law designed, ironically, to protect privacy. The Family Educational
 Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 110 known generally as the "Buckley
 106 See Goodale, James G, " Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Privilege for Newsmen",
 Hastings Law Journal , XXVI (January 1975), p. 709; "Note: Reporters and Their Sources: The
 Constitutional Right to a Confidential Relationship", Yale Law Journal , LXXX (December 1970) p. 317.
 Branzburg v. Hayes , 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
 107 See e.g. , Baker '.F& F Investments , 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir, 1971), cert, denied , 411 U.S. 966 (1973);
 Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972); Loadhoítz v. Fields , 389 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla.
 1975); but see also Garland v. Torre , 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958), cert, denied , 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
 109 S eee.g. , Vermont v. St. Peter, 316 A.2d 254 (Vt. 1 974); but see also In re Färber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d
 330, cert, denied , 439 U.S. 997 (1978).
 109 See United States v. Doe, 460 F.2d 328 (1st Cir. 1972), cert, denied , 411 U.S. 909 (1973); Richards of
 Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas <£ Electric Co., 71 F.R.D. 388 (N.D. Cal. 1976); United States v. Doe, 332 F.
 Supp. 930 (D. Mass. 1971). See "Note: The Public Scholar and the First Amendment: A Compelling Need
 for Compelling Testimony?", George Washington Law Review, XL (July 1972), p. 995.
 110 United States Code, Title 20, sections 1232g-1232i (1976).
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 amendment" after its chief sponsor former Senator James L. Buckley of
 New York, prohibits educational institutions receiving federal financial
 support from disclosing all but inconsequential information about their
 students. The law serves two functions: it gives a student access to the
 university's records as they bear on him111 and it limits the distribution of
 information about a student to third parties without his prior consent.112 The
 first of these functions gives a student access to letters of recommendation
 and other comments made about him by his teachers. It also means that no
 one, except the teacher, the individual student and the registrar, need ever
 know the student's marks. Even parents paying upwards of $10,000 a year
 for tuition fees, maintenance and other charges are not entitled to know how
 well or poorly their son or daughter is doing at university.
 The "Buckley amendment" is a frivolous law as written and applied. It
 makes internal academic concerns a matter of federal law and it inserts the
 government immediately between the student and his teachers. It has a
 pernicious effect on private communications. Anglo-American law has long
 recognised private letters as sacrosanct communications between the writer
 and the recipient.113 The "Buckley amendment" turns that tradition and
 legal principle on its head and makes the confidential letters of a teacher
 concerning a particular student quasi-public by giving the student access to
 them. It obviously is an impediment to candour. In actual practice, the law
 can be abrogated by a "waiver of access" by the student, by telephone calls
 in lieu of letters and by handwritten notes without copies in the files. This
 particular aspect of academic confidentiality is not of great significance but it
 is another example of the degree to which government is intruding into the
 internal functioning of a university.
 Effects of Governmental Action on the Internal Life of Universities
 Scientists, and to a smaller extent, scholars, depend on governmental
 grants to pursue their research. Whatever the external sources may be,
 recipients of grants are necessarily in the position of serving two or more
 masters; their loyalty to their universities is eroded by their independence of
 it and their correspondingly increased attention to government as a source of
 support for their research. The administrative officers of the university are
 usually pleased to receive grants, despite increased administrative costs,
 because they ease the financial condition of the university. But these
 administrative officers also have to bear the burden of greatly increased
 surveillance by government. Those who are most likely to be concerned
 about the impact of regulations on the university are also those who receive
 the least of the direct benefits. Resentment among recipients of grants
 towards their own universities arises from the university's charge of "indi-
 1,1 Ibid., section 1232g (a) (1) (A).
 112 Ibid., section 1232g (b) (1).
 3 See e.g. , Foltz v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 189 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1951).
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 rect costs". This accentuates the scientist's alienation from the university.114
 Although this has no direct influence on academic freedom and the question
 of its constitutional status, it does affect the university as an "intellectual
 corporation" by increasing the likelihood of conflict.
 The constitutional status of such a corporate body is of fundamental
 importance. In American constitutional law, this matter is dealt with under
 the name of the "right of association".
 Rights of Association and the Concept of the Institution
 The first and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution do
 not simply protect an individual's right to engage in a constitutionally pro-
 tected activity as an individual; they also protect, as a matter of constitutional
 right, the decision to join with other like-minded persons to seek similar
 objectives. The constitution has not been construed to protect the act of
 joining or the right of association independently of the individual rights
 which the associating members seek to pursue in common.115 This does not
 mean that everything which can be advocated, sought or done legally by an
 individual can equally legally be done by a group. An individual may, for
 instance, choose not to rent or to sell his house in a racially discriminatory
 way,116 but associating for the purpose of practising racial discrimination
 may be prohibited.117 The narrowness of the right of association does not
 wholly defeat its utility in establishing the constitutional right of academic
 freedom.
 The right of association, in the constitutional sense, does not obtain for
 state universities. A university founded and supported by the state is an
 agency of the state itself; it is not a voluntary association of individuals
 although voluntary associations can exist within such institutions and may
 claim the protection of the constitution.118 Private universities, even those
 receiving substantial governmental assistance, are the only ones to which the
 constitutional right to freedom of association is pertinent. Despite their
 sometimes intricate internal distribution of authority, the limitations on
 access, and the hierarchy of status within them, private universities are
 as much voluntary associations of individuals as are labour unions,119
 114 See e.g. , Winks, R., "Government and the University'', (unpublished).
 118 This has been argued. See Raggi, R., "An Independent Right to Freedom of Association", Harvard
 Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law Review , XII (Winter 1977), p. 1.
 "• The Fair Housing Act of 1968 which prohibits racial discrimination in the sale or rental of homes and
 apartments exempts single-family homes offered by the owner and rooms or units within small owner-
 occupied apartment houses. United States Code, Title 42, Sections 3603 (b) (1), (2) (1976). Even so,
 an individual act of discrimination may give rise to a private cause of action. See ibid., Section 1982 (1970);
 Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park , 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968);
 Morris v. Cizek, 503 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1974).
 117 See Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association , 410 U.S. 431 (1973). For a discussion and
 compilation of laws and cases on this subject within the university context, see "Note: Academic Freedom
 and Federal Regulation of University Hiring", Harvard Law Review , XCII (February 1979), p. 879.
 113 See e.g. , Healey v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
 119 See United States v. Brown , 381 U.S. 437 (1965); American Communications Association v. Douds, 339
 U.S. 382 (1950).
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 group legal services programmes,120 political parties121 or fraternal
 associations.122
 The constitutional status of the right of association provides a basis for
 challenging state intrusion into the affairs of a university which hinders the
 effective realisation of individual interests. It also provides the foundation
 for the argument for university autonomy as a concomitant of individual
 freedom.
 A governmental regulation of an organisation can adversely affect the
 enjoyment of their individual rights by members of that organisation, even
 though the regulation was not specifically directed at the individuals them-
 selves.123 A governmental request for lists of members of an association, for
 example, may violate the rights of association. A decision of the Supreme
 Court in the case oiShelton v. Tucker,12* in 1960 is illustrative. An Arkansas
 statute required each public school teacher to report annually all organisa-
 tions to which he belonged or to which he had made a contribution during
 the preceding five years. The United States Supreme Court struck down the
 law as an unconstitutional impediment to the exercise of the right of associa-
 tion. An attempt to regulate the procedures of internal government even in
 the interests of greater "democracy" or "fairness" might also be chal-
 lenged.12* A regulation which hampers a university, as a private association,
 in the pursuit of its principal goals of teaching, investigating and pub-
 lishing - all of which are themselves rights of the individual - is clearly an
 issue of constitutional significance.
 The utility of an association for the pursuit of individual interests is
 particularly evident in the working of the university. University teachers
 need not only students, but also large libraries, laboratories, research assis-
 tants, reference librarians and clerical staffs. They cannot do useful or
 creative work without at least some of this help. It really makes little sense to
 discuss the individual interests of members of universities as if they could be
 pursued other than corporately.
 American universities have been particularly affected in recent years by
 the "affirmative action" programmes designed to give precedence to certain
 "minority" groups and women in appointments and admissions. "Affirma-
 tive action" programmes developed subsequently to legislative and judicial
 action during the 1950s and 1960s; they prohibited discrimination on
 grounds of race, belief or national origin, and, to a lesser extent, on grounds
 of sex, age or physical handicap. Merely prohibiting discrimination was not
 110 See United Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United Mine Workers
 v. Illinois State Bar Association , 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia , 377
 U.S. 1 (1964).
 121 Elrod v. Burns , 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Cousins v. Wigoda , 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
 m Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S! 163 (1972).
 123 See e.g. , Talley v. California , 362 U.S. 60 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rei. Patterson , 357 U.S. 449
 (1958).
 114 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
 125 See e.g., Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,
 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
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 thought to be sufficient to transform a segregated society into an "inte-
 grated" one as rapidly as some had hoped. In order to accelerate "integra-
 tion", the federal government intervened to require employers to seek out
 ethnic applicants for appointments, and the courts have approved not only
 plans for enlarging "reservoirs" of applicants but also programmes which
 give preference to members of specified groups by reason of racial, ethnic or
 sexual characteristics.126 Governmentally imposed discrimination among
 ethnic groups and the granting of precedence to some of them is inconsistent
 with traditional American ideas about the equal dignity of individuals. The
 application of these discriminatory programmes to university admissions
 and appointments certainly raises constitutional issues.
 An essential aspect of a voluntary private association is control over
 admission to membership. In universities this means control over who is
 admitted as a student, who is appointed as a teacher and who, ultimately,
 joins the permanent teaching staff. Almost invariably the teaching staff
 determines the general educational policy which defines the character of the
 institution. Administrators, trustees and benefactors may wield enormous
 persuasive powers, but whether a university is strong in the arts or in the
 sciences, rewards research, seeks to develop cross-disciplinary studies,
 admits students on the basis of a desire to have a random sample of the
 population as a whole or mainly those with a bent for engineering, is largely
 determined by the intellectual standards and attitudes of the teaching
 faculty. Thus, governmental policies specifying criteria of admissions and
 appointments are clearly infringements of the autonomy of the teaching staff
 and of the university as an association. The courts have consistently subordi-
 nated decisions about admissions or appointments to governmental policies
 directed toward the pursuit of egalitarian goals, and they have given only
 limited legal protection to the autonomy of the university. Several important
 recent judicial decisions touching on this issue contradict one another. This
 opens the way for careful consideration of the constitutional status of the
 autonomy of the university and governmental policies bearing on it.
 Traditionally, an essential element of freedom of contract has been the
 right to choose the partner with whom to contract.127 This is obviously of
 great significance in the pursuit of associational interests. The Supreme
 Court has limited this aspect of freedom of contract to remove race as a
 permissible ground for choice, a development limiting free association
 through contract but also providing a strong argument against compulsory
 discrimination in favour of particular ethnic groups. Thirteen years ago the
 Supreme Court ruled that a refusal to sell a house to a Negro simply because
 he was a Negro could be prohibited because the practice of racial discrimina-
 tion was a "badge of slavery" which the thirteenth amendment, emancipat-
 ,16 See United States Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Equal
 Employment Opportunity Commission V.AT& T, 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977), cert, denied , 438 U.S. 915
 (1978).
 m American Law Institute, Restatement of Contracts Section 19 (b) (St. Paul: American Law Institute
 Publishers, 1936).
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 ing the slaves, was intended to eradicate.128 This argument was carried
 substantially further in the case of Runyon v. McCrary 129 in which the
 Court ruled that black parents had a right of action under a federal civil
 rights statute against a private school which refused admission to their minor
 children on racial grounds. The statute forming the basis for the action
 provided that, "All persons . . . shall have the same right in every State and
 Territory to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citi-
 zens."130 This law was one of several passed just after the Civil War for the
 avowed purpose of conferring full citizenship on the freed slaves. The
 dissenters in the case of Runyon argued that it did no more than ensure
 equality with whites who were themselves not free to compel someone else
 to be a contracting party against the other person's will, however blame-
 worthy his motives.131 The majority specifically rejected this view and
 concluded that the intent of the post-Civil War amendments and enabling
 statutes was not only to provide former slaves with civil status equivalent to
 that of whites but also to remove race as a qualifying criterion in most
 transactions. The majority said quite straightforwardly: "[A] Negro's right
 to 'make contracts' is violated if a private offeror refuses to extend to a
 Negro, solely because he is a Negro, the same opportunity to enter into
 contracts as he extends to white offerees."132
 What was surprising in the decision in the case of Runyon was the
 movement from strict reliance on the thirteenth amendment, which by its
 very terms applied to former Negro slaves, to generalised reliance on the
 fourteenth amendment which applies to all citizens. The same day that the
 Runyon case was decided, the Court also rendered an opinion in the case of
 McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. 133 holding that both section
 1981 (the statute at issue in the case of Runyon) and Title VII of the Civil
 Rights Act of 1964 protect white as well as non-white persons from acts of
 racial discrimination in private employment. Constitutional amendments
 and laws originally designed to promote slaves from the status of involuntary
 servitude to that of full citizenship, and later laws passed to remove the
 vestiges of discriminatory legislation against Negroes were thus expanded to
 provide a charter for the government to remove racial bias from private as
 well as public transactions.134
 Governmental intrusion into the making of private contracts to promote
 policies of racial integration in a pluralistic society may or may not be
 desirable. The point is debatable. The decisions in the case of Runyon and
 "■ Jones v. Alfred H . Mayer Co. , 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
 "• 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
 130 United States Code, Title 42, Section 1981 (1976).
 1,1 427 U.S. at 192-94 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist joined m the dissent.
 inIbid., pp. 170-71.
 118 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
 In the McDonald case, the court tried to exclude affirmative action programmes from the impact of the
 decision. 427 U.S. at 280, n. 8. The problem is that the Court's rationale makes such an exclusion anomalous.
 See also "Note: The Expanding Scope of Section 1981: Assault on Private Discrimination and a Cloud on
 Affirmative Action", Harvard Law Review , XC (December 1976), p. 412.
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 similar cases do, nevertheless, significantly intrude into the making of deci-
 sions in the affairs of private associations. The decision in the case of Runyon
 does not invade the personal, social and domestic spheres135 but it does bear
 on the contractual relationships which would be important in universities.
 Overt racial discrimination is itself contrary to the ethical norms which
 justify academic freedom; laws which prohibit university teachers from
 doing something already prohibited by their own ethical values should not
 present much of a problem for members of an academic community.
 Nevertheless the decision in the case of Runyon and its companion case do
 present difficulties for higher educational institutions specifically designed
 to serve intellectual objectives, because such objectives are incompatible
 with the objective of assuring that its membership should have a determinate
 ethnic or religious composition. Furthermore, they establish precedents for
 extensive state involvement in the affairs of private voluntary associations,
 including private universities. These cases also present a conflict of principle
 with the policy of "affirmative action". The decision in the case of Runyon y
 read together with that in the McDonald case, requires "colour blindness" in
 the making of contracts. Affirmative action programmes, in contrast,
 require "colour-consciousness" and discrimination among ethnic groups.
 Although the United States Supreme Court has avoided facing the issue, the
 two approaches are fundamentally irreconcilable. The opinion rendered by
 the Supreme Court in the case of Runyon implies the inadmissibility of the
 "affirmative action" programme in universities.
 The enigmatic set of opinions issued by the Supreme Court in the famous
 Bakke 136 case do little to clarify the current status of racial or sexual criteria
 in appointments and admissions. The narrow ruling of the Court was that the
 special admissions programme of the medical school of the University of
 California at Davis which set aside a certain number of places in each
 entering class for ethnic minorities violated Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
 Act,157 one of the series of laws passed in the 1950s and 1960s prohibiting
 racial discrimination. Despite finding this particular plan to be impermiss-
 ibly "racist", the Court then went on to say that race might be a factor that
 could legitimately be taken into account in decisions about admissions.
 Several members of the Court also hinted in the decision in the case of Bakke
 that the decision in the case of McDonald and its application of Title VII of
 the Civil Rights Act of 1964 might preclude racial criteria in appointments,
 although that issue was not before the Court.138 Two years later, however,
 the Court approved the application of racial criteria in an employment-
 training programme by a major industrial firm.139 That case does not say that
 1,8 427 U.S. at 187-89 (Powell, J., concurring).
 134 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke , 438 U.S. 465 (1978).
 m See ibid., pp. 281-89, 314-22; ibid., pp. 413-21 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
 ln Ibid. , pp. 413-15 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). Interestingly, Justice Stevens was the author
 of the opinion in the McDonald case in which affirmative action was supposedly excluded from the effects of
 the decision. See n. 134 above.
 m United States Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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 racial discrimination in the initial appointment is permissible, but it certainly
 does support that conclusion by permitting such preferences in selecting
 individuals for training which will lead to promotions. Most recently, the
 Court sustained a federal law requiring that 10 per cent, of the work on
 certain public projects be awarded to "minority business enterprises".140
 The Court's own views on "affirmative action" thus remain ambivalent, or,
 at best, obscure.
 Whatever the Supreme Court's ultimate opinion on "affirmative action"
 and its possible justification under the rationale adopted in the decision on
 the Runyon case, the lower courts have continued to apply the civil rights
 statutes to academic appointments. As a matter of principle, there may be
 difficulties in working out a general justification for distinctions between an
 individual's "right" to choose his social partners and an individual's "right"
 to choose his partners in work or in a contractual relationship, particularly in
 cases involving close and intimate relationships over a substantial period of
 time.141 The law does make such distinctions, nevertheless, and the govern-
 ment's intrusion is justified largely by the inclusion of commerce - broadly
 defined - within the area of "direct state interest". Universities are not
 exempt, despite their status as "non-profit" institutions because they are
 employers of large numbers and have considerable control over preparation
 for entry into a wide range of occupations, including highly specialised
 appointments in research and teaching. Even if universities refused to accept
 federal funds they would still not avoid subjection to the government's
 review of their employment practices. Universities are subject to "fair
 employment" legislation, and the conditions set by the Internal Revenue
 Service, for their exemption from liability to taxation.
 Recently, the question of what constitutes direct governmental support
 for discrimination has been broadened somewhat to include more careful
 analysis of tax-exemptions. A private school without a "racially non-
 discriminatory policy" is not entitled to a tax exemption even if it meets all
 other qualifications as a "non-profit", educational institution. The applic-
 able regulation of the Internal Revenue Service reads as follows:
 A "racially non-discriminatory policy as to students" is defined as meaning that the
 school admits the students of any race to all the rights, privileges, programs, and
 activities generally accorded or made available to students at that school and that the
 school does not discriminate on the basis of race in administration of its educational
 policies, admissions policies, scholarship and loan programs, and athletic and other
 school administered programs.142
 140 Fullilove v. Klutznick , 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
 141 See e.g. , Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore , 425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). "Note: Tenure and
 Partnership as Title VII Remedies", Harvard Law Review , XCIV (December 1980), p. 457.
 142 Revenue Ruling 71-447, 1971-2 Cumulative Bulletin 230. See also Internal Revenue Code, Section
 501 (c) (3); Revenue Ruling 75-231, 1975-1 Cumulative Bulletin 158. The Internal Revenue Service
 reported that a number of schools gave up their exemptions rather than comply with the ruling. News Release
 IR-1 930 (9 January, 1978). Schools must also publish statements that they do not discriminate on the basis of
 race, colour or national or ethnic origin. There are other policing provisions and reporting requirements. See
 Revenue Procedure 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587; Green v. Connolly , 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), affd sub
 nom. , Coit v. Green , 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
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 There is an exception for racial discrimination based upon legitimately held
 religious beliefs, but it is extraordinarily difficult for a school to convince the
 Internal Revenue Service or a court, first, that racial discrimination is
 required by religious belief and, second, that this belief must be exercised
 through the operation of a private school entitled to at least indirect
 governmental support through the privilege of exemption from taxation.148
 Even if a private educational institution receives no governmental finan-
 cial support of any kind, including tax-exemption, the decision in the case of
 Runy on provides that it may still be subject to a private action for a violation
 of civil rights if it refuses to admit students on the basis of racial criteria. The
 only possible exception, and one which is largely theoretical, is again for the
 school the policies of which are derived from a genuine religious belief.144
 These various governmental policies, despite some inconsistencies, do
 represent a concerted governmental effort to promote goals of equality in
 most institutions. They place a distinct limit on the exercise of the right of
 association in economic institutions and in decisions about the admission of
 students to educational institutions at all levels. The legal right to think,
 believe, speak, write and organise freely stops when the freedom is used by a
 group of like-minded individuals to promote various forms of racial dis-
 crimination which have the possible effect of denying access to employment
 or educational opportunities. Legal resistance to such governmental policies
 can be effective only if it can be shown that the government's action in a
 particular case is contrary to the principle of equality, which is generally the
 case in "affirmative action", or that it has the inevitable effect of denying a
 specific, individual right.
 The recognition of even limited rights of association of individuals does
 not necessarily support a right of complete institutional autonomy. By
 joining together in a group individuals collectively subject themselves to
 laws, rules, and regulations applicable to the activities of groups which
 would not normally be applicable to individuals. So long as all similarly
 situated groups have to comply with the same set of rules, there is no
 immediate legal issue suggested by the imposition of certain restraints on the
 actions of groups that are not imposed on individuals. When the restrictions
 on the actions of a group are so great that they interfere with the vindication
 of constitutionally protected interests that individual members of the group
 seek to assert through their association, the group may then assert claims as a
 group against the government.145 At least one recent decision and some
 analyses of that decision go further and suggest that there may be separate,
 identifiable rights in groups, as groups, which are usually enjoyed only by
 143 See Bob Jones University v. United States , 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980) (Revocation of tax exemption
 upheld where a university practises racial discrimination in its admissions despite the argument that the same
 was an exercise of religious belief.)
 144 427 U.S. at 167-68. See "Note: Racial Discrimination in Private Schools, Section 1981, and the Free
 Exercise of Religion: The Sectarian Loophole of Runyon v. McCrary ", University of Colorado Law Review ,
 XL VIII (Spring 1977), p. 419.
 145 See Emerson, Thomas, The System of Freedom of Expression (New York: Random House, 1970),
 pp. 675-96.
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 individuals, as individuals. The analysis has largely been directed towards
 developing a theory of corporate bodies with a principled justification for
 their assertion of rights as corporate bodies.146
 Associations, as legal artefacts, can have legal rights in property for which
 they are accorded full constitutional protection. Newspaper companies have
 been allowed to assert first amendment claims under the "press clause" but,
 with the exception of the mass media, what are generally considered to be
 purely individual, personal rights have not been recognised as an incident of
 corporate existence. Corporations cannot vote and the privacy which they
 enjoy is derived strictly from their proprietary interests in trade secrets or
 information affecting their competitive powers and not from some notion of
 inherent interests. But, in the case of First National Bank of Boston v.
 Bellotti ,147 the United States Supreme Court ruled that the Commonwealth
 of Massachusetts could not prohibit corporations from spending money to
 express political views. The Court had previously recognised financial
 expenditures in support of political views to be a form of protected ex-
 pression,148 and the decision in the Bellotti case gave corporations, as
 corporations, rights of free speech. Although the Bellotti decision was in line
 with the "commercial speech" cases in that most "commercial speech" is
 undertaken by business organisations and not by individuals, it did raise
 some rather subtle questions about the identity of the speaker in the case of
 free speech by a corporate body. The decision in the case of Bellotti suggests
 that, at least to a limited extent, a business organisation the existence of
 which may be grounded in individual rights of contract and association
 acquires an existence as an entity holding rights separate and apart from its
 own individual creators and separate from any legal recognition conferred
 upon it by the state.149
 Many universities will probably look upon the decision in the case of
 Bellotti as irrelevant to their corporate undertakings, since most are chary of
 taking stands, as institutions, on issues in public controversy. The decision in
 the case of Bellotti, none the less, may serve as at least partial support for the
 concept of institutional autonomy as a matter of legal right, and it may
 provide a sound basis for the exercise of rights of free speech by institutions
 with a clearly defined set of tasks. The test of the impact of the decision in the
 case of Bellotti on statements by universities as corporate bodies is most
 likely to come in challenges to tax regulations. A non-profit-making institu-
 tion can lose its tax exemption if it becomes actively involved in political
 lobbying. Religious institutions may have a clearly defined set of tasks
 supporting strong stands on some issues. Others may seek to influence
 144 Pilon, Roger, "Corporations and Rights: On Treating Corporate People Justly", Georgia Law Review ,
 XIII (Summer 1979), p. 1245. See also ibid., "Ordering Rights Consistently: Or What We Do and Do Not
 Have Rights To'*, ibid., p. 1171; Vieira, Edwin, "Rights and the United States Constitution: The Declension
 from Natural Law to Legal Positivism", ibid. , p. 1447.
 147 435 U.S. 765(1978).
 148 Buckley v. Voleo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
 149 Justice Rehnquist was the only member of the Court who had fundamental doubts about this whole
 notion. See 435 U.S., pp. 822-28 (Rehnquist, dissenting).
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 political decisions by boycotting business firms which do business with South
 Africa, or, depending on the political views of the boycotters, the Soviet
 Union, Chile, Argentina, Iraq, Israel and others, or which manufacture
 certain products which are, in the university's view, obnoxious.
 Wholly aside from theoretical arguments about the autonomy of institu-
 tions as opposed to that of individuals, courts have, over a period of years,
 recognised the autonomy of educational institutions by deferring to them in
 the exercise of professional judgements about matters such as curriculum,
 marks and the discipline of students. This deference is evident in the often
 expressed judicial reluctance to review decisions by local school boards
 about the syllabus of courses of study, teaching methods and text book
 selection in the public schools. This is even more evident in judicial opinions
 which refuse to review internal disciplinary or scholastic decisions. The
 Supreme Court's opinion in a case upholding the academic dismissal of a
 student from the medical school of the University of Missouri at Kansas City
 is a good example:
 We decline to ignore the historic judgment of educators and thereby formalize the
 academic dismissal process by requiring a hearing. The educational process is not by
 nature adversary; instead it centers around a continuing relationship between faculty
 and students, one in which the teacher must occupy many roles - educator, adviser,
 friend, and, at times, parent-substitute. . . . This is especially true as one advances
 through the varying regimes of the educational system, and the instruction becomes
 both more individualized and more specialized
 judicial presence in the academic community and thereby risk deterioration of many
 beneficial aspects of the faculty-student relationship.150
 This approach is consistent with the arguments made more than a half-
 century ago by the late Professor Zechariah Chafee.151 He contended that
 there should be a presumption favouring governmental restraint in dealing
 with the internal affairs of non-profit-making institutions. He conceded a
 substantial interest of the state in the activities of firms engaged in commer-
 cial enterprises because of a general social concern with the creation and
 allocation of wealth,152 but he questioned not only the government's interest
 in the affairs of other institutions but also the government's ability to
 promote the public interest by intervention.
 1W Board of Curators v. Horowitz y 435 U.S. 78, 90 (1978). See also Mahavongsanan '.Hall, 529 F.2d 448
 (5th Or. 1976); Connelly v. University of Vermont* 244 F. Supp. 156 (D. Vt. 1965); Mustell v. Rose, 282 Ala.
 358, 211 So.2d 489 ,cert. denied , 393 U.S. 936 (1968); Coffelt v. Nicholson , 224 Ark. 176, 272 S.W.2d 309
 (1954); Militaría v. University of Miami, 236 So. 2d 1 62 (Fla. Rist. Ct. App. 1970 ),cert. denied , 401 U.S. 962
 (1971); Bluett v. Board of Trustees, 10 111. App. 2d 207, 145 N.E.2d 635 (1956); Sherman v. Hyman , 180
 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822, cert, denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1942); Foley v. Benedict, 122 Tex. 193, 55 S.W.2d 805
 (1932); Frank v. Marquette University , 209 Wis. 372, 245 N.W. 125 (1932). The relationship between
 private universities and their students is generally governed by principles of contract law and the terms of the
 contract are governed by the bulletin. See Slaughter v. Brigham Young University , 514 F.2d 622 (10th Cir.
 1975); Jansen v. Emory University , 440 F. Supp. 1060 (N.D. Ga. 1977); "Note: Contract Law and the
 Student-University Relationship", Indiana Law Journal, XL VIII (Winter 1973), p. 253.
 141 Chafee, Zechariah, "The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit", Harvard Law Review, XLIII
 (May 1930), p. 993.
 1M One can quarrel with his reasoning in justifying governmental intervention in the economy. Writing in
 1930, however, Professor Chafee might have been sceptical of the ability of the free market to regulate itself
 without disastrous consequences for large numbers of persons.
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 The health of society will usually be promoted if the groups within it which serve the
 industrial, mental and spiritual needs of citizens are genuinely alive. Like individuals,
 they will usually do most for the community if they are free to determine their own
 lives for the present and the future. A due regard for the corresponding interests of
 others is desirable but must be somewhat enforced by public opinion. . . . Legal
 supervision must often be withheld for fear that it may do more harm than good
 We shall be more doubtful of the probable wisdom of state participation in the affairs
 of such a group if we are accustomed to think of the state itself as just one more kind
 of association, which, like the others, should keep to its own functions, and which
 must be judged according to the value and efficiency of the services it renders us in
 return for rather high annual dues.158
 The conclusion is that the law recognises at least a limited measure of
 institutional autonomy which has its roots in the rights of association of the
 constituent members of the institution. The state may intrude greatly into
 this autonomy to promote significant governmental interests, such as
 equality. In every instance, however, governmental intrusion may be
 measured against a background of individual interests and protected legal
 rights collectively pursued through a voluntary association which itself has
 certain interests and limited rights as an institution separate from the
 aggregate of the individual interests and the rights of its members.
 A Brief Survey of the Justification of Protection of Individual Expression
 There is no such thing in the United States as a constitutional right of
 academic freedom, nor is there a privileged legal status which attaches to the
 academic profession. Nevertheless, the interests which are subsumed within
 the concepts of Lehrfreiheit and Lernfreiheit are, separately and in the
 aggregate, entitled to varying degrees of legal protection. Thus, the status of
 an academic may not be protected as such, but what scholars and scientists
 do is generally accorded a presumption of constitutional protection. This
 represents a fundamental legal and social respect for teaching and scholar-
 ship, the importance of which cannot be minimised. Scholarly and scientific
 work is, by reason of its legal protection- as limited as that may be in varying
 contexts - part and parcel of liberal-democratic society itself; it is an activity of
 individual interest, importance and worth and not simply another undertaking
 of the welfare state which may be subjected to constantly shifting political
 desires and choices.
 Of course, the Constitution of the United States applies only within the
 national borders and the legal protection afforded scholars and scientists in
 their work varies considerably among democratic countries. Indeed, the
 constitutional protections are themselves subject to reasonable limitations
 in particular situations so that the system is far from perfect from the
 perspective of an academic. What is important about the cases dealing with
 academic freedom is that, for the most part, they tend to define these
 concerns as individual interests in expression, conscience and autonomy.
 The protection afforded those interests by the law has generally been
 1M Chafee, Z., op. cit., pp. 1027, 1029.
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 justified by the acknowledgement of their place at the heart of a liberal-
 democratic outlook. This in itself tends to universalise these interests
 beyond the confines of American constitutional law to the broader setting of
 the theory of a liberal-democratic society. The underlying justification for
 the protection of these interests, whatever the specific language of the
 applicable positive law, should be applicable in any liberal democracy.
 The first amendment to the United States Constitution specifically pro-
 tects free speech, free press, religious belief and the right to assemble for the
 purpose of petitioning the government. The fourteenth amendment was
 addressed primarily at the states and was largely intended to provide a
 constitutional mechanism, together with the thirteenth which outlawed
 slavery, and the fifteenth which guaranteed the right of franchise to former
 slaves, for abolishing the status of slavery. It has operated beyond that as a
 charter for the development of a generalised conception of individual lib-
 erty. Other amendments have been important in protecting the interests of
 scholars and scientists, but the first amendment as supplemented by the
 fourteenth has had, by far, the greatest significance. Its interpretation in the
 context of life in a liberal-democratic society, is important to an understand-
 ing of the underlying justification for the protection of such interests.
 Freedom of speech and freedom of the press were certainly ideas of great
 importance to the framers of the United States Constitution. Alexander
 Hamilton, for instance, considered a free press to be so fundamental to the
 idea of democracy that he was opposed to the inclusion of a constitutional
 provision restraining governments from interfering with the press for fear
 that such a provision would imply that the government could have done so in
 the absence of such a restriction.
 Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained,
 when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed? I will not contend that
 such a provision would confer a regulating power; but it is evident that it would
 furnish, to men disposed to usurp, a plausible pretence for claiming that power. They
 might urge with a semblance of reason, that the Constitution ought not to be charged
 with the absurdity of providing against the abuse of an authority which was not given,
 and that the provision against restraining the liberty of the press afforded a clear
 implication, that a power to prescribe proper regulations concerning it was intended
 to be vested in the national government.154
 Even so, the Federalist administration of President John Adams - and
 Hamilton was a Federalist - enacted the infamous "Sedition law" which was
 used to imprison newspaper editors and others in the recently formed
 republic who were critical of the government. Most of these were Jefferso-
 nians and with the Republican victory in the election of 1800 the "Sedition
 law" proved to be short-lived.155 Very little mention was made of the first
 amendment during the remainder of the nineteenth century, although there
 *** Hamilton, Alexander, The Federalist , no. 84.
 1M In his first inaugural address, delivered on 4 March, 1801, Thomas Jefferson spoke of a "revolution" in
 the election of 1800 as real as that of 1776 with a thinly disguised attack on the sedition laws. See Pollak,
 Louis, The Constitution and the Supreme Court: A Documentary History (Cleveland: World Publishing Co.,
 1968), vol. II, pp. 5-6.
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 was extensive suppression of the press during the Civil War.156 Serious
 consideration of the first amendment is a twentieth-century development
 which can be traced from a series of prosecutions under the Espionage Act
 during and immediately after the First World War.
 Within the case law and the commentaries, the scope of protection
 afforded communicative activities has been largely defined and justified by
 three separate doctrinal approaches. These are: Justice Holmes's doctrine of
 the "market-place of ideas", and a similar theory articulated by Professor
 Alexander Meiklejohn; Justice Black's absolutist approach strictly pro-
 hibiting state interference but narrowly defining speech, and the indi-
 vidualistic approach, which defines speech as an individual right in and of
 itself, an end rather than a means in a liberal-democratic society. The
 student of the first amendment will immediately note that these three do not
 exhaust the possibility of theoretical approaches, but they provide a useful
 separation of theories which illustrate differing ways of justifying the
 generalised legal protection afforded to freedom of speech.
 In a consideration of academic freedom, the least helpful doctrine is that
 of the late Justice Hugo Black. He approached judicial interpretation with a
 keen sensitivity to the language of the applicable documents. His role as a
 judge, in his opinion, was to apply the literal language of the constitution to
 the particular controversy before him. Thus, he had little patience with
 fellow-judges who found broader concepts of "liberty" in the constitution
 than specified by its particular language. In criticising his colleagues for
 developing a constitutional right of privacy beyond that contained in the
 prohibition of the fourth amendment against warrantless searches, he said,
 The Court talks about a constitutional "right of privacy" as though there is some
 constitutional provision or provisions forbidding any law ever to be passed which
 might abridge the "privacy" of individuals. But there is not. . . . One of the most
 effective ways of diluting or expanding a constitutionally guaranteed right is to
 substitute for the crucial word or words of a constitutional guarantee another word or
 words, more or less flexible and more or less restricted in meaning
 broad, abstract and ambiguous concept which can easily be shrunken in meaning but
 which can also, on the other hand, easily be interpreted as a constitutional ban
 against many things other than searches and seizures. I have expressed the view many
 times that First Amendment freedoms, for example, have suffered from a failure of
 the Courts to stick to the simple language of the First Amendment in construing it,
 instead of invoking multitudes of words substituted for those the Framers used
 For these reasons I get nowhere in this case by talk about a constitutional "right of
 privacy" as an emanation from one or more constitutional provisions. I like my
 privacy as well as the next one, but I am nevertheless compelled to admit that
 government has a right to invade it unless prohibited by some specific constitutional
 provision.157
 When Justice Black found a specific constitutional provision, however, he
 applied it forcefully and literally. He argued that the first amendment
 absolutely barred any actions for defamation,158 prohibited any prior
 1M See Hall, James O., "Free Speech in War Time", Columbia Law Review , XXI (June 1921), p. 526.
 1M Griswold v. Connecticut , 381 U.S. 479, 508-10 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
 188 New York Times Co . v. Sullivan , 376 U.S. 254, 293-97 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
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 restraint on speech or press,159 and prevented any prosecution for the
 publication of obscene books.160 He recognised technological advances and
 freely extended "speech" to include the use of amplification devices.161 On
 the other hand, his literalism allowed no room for a reading of "speech" that
 would include expressive acts or forms of non-verbal communication.162
 Justice Black's views never commanded a majority in the Supreme Court
 and even his most loyal colleagues, such as Justice Douglas, abandoned him
 for a more expanded reading of the "speech clause" or for interpretations
 allowing greater governmental control. He was one of the few judges,
 nevertheless, to develop a systematic theory of free expression as protected
 by the law and to apply that theory consistently. Whatever the criticisms one
 may have of his conclusions, there was a rigorous and plain elegance about
 his approach which often brought to light shortcomings in the arguments of
 his fellow-judges by the frequent repetition of the simple question: "Is this
 speech which is in dispute or is it something else?"
 The approach of Justice Black is not very helpful, however, in developing
 a consistent theory of academic freedom as a form of free expression. His
 analysis is too closely tied to the language of specific legal documents and is
 more a theory of constitutional interpretation than of free expression.
 Although Justice Black clearly thought that free speech was essential to
 liberal democracy, his approach to constitutional interpretation deferred
 greatly -to the political process for determining the permissible limits of
 governmental intrusion into the private affairs of citizens; if that process
 were to have redefined the first amendment, Black would probably have
 thought himself constrained to go along.163 Of course, if what a scholar did in
 a certain instance were speech - or print - it would have been absolutely
 protected as a matter of constitutional law under Justice Black's approach.
 This takes us little farther than the positive law in defining academic
 interests,164 but a variation on Justice Black's simple question might well be
 applied in the academic situation: "Is what we are trying to protect or
 preserve an aspect of free inquiry and discourse or is it simply a privilege
 enjoyed as an aspect of a privileged status?" It may seem heretical to ask
 such a question, but there are clearly situations in which the energies of
 academics seem directed more toward the preservation of a congenial club
 of like-minded persons and less toward freely ranging intellectual inquiry.165
 The Holmes doctrine of a "market-place of ideas" was first articulated in a
 "• New York Times Co. v. United States , 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
 iao Ginzburg v. United States , 383 U.S. 463, 476 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
 161 Kovacs v. Cooper , 336 U.S. 77, 104 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting).
 in Brown v. Louisiana , 383 U.S. 131,151 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting); Cox v. Louisiana , 379 U.S. 536,
 559 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
 m See Ginsberg v. New York , 390 U.S. 629, 655 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Black, J.).
 164 For more on this general point, see Grey, Thomas. "Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?" Stanford
 Law Review , XXVII (February 1975), p. 703.
 This is often the perhaps unfair criticism levelled at scholars who oppose affirmative action
 programmes. See e.g., Tollett, Kenneth, "What Is All the Shouting About?", in Hook, Sidney, Kurtz, Paul
 and Todorovich, Miro (eds.), The University and the State: What Role for Government in Higher Education?
 (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1978), p. 78.
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 dissenting opinion to a decision of the Supreme Court upholding convictions
 of agitators who had urged American workers to halt the production of
 weapons that could be used by the American Expeditionary Force sent by
 President Wilson to intervene in the Russian Revolution. Justice Holmes
 wrote:
 Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you have
 no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your heart
 you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. To allow
 opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent, as when a
 man says that he has squared the circle, or that you do not care wholeheartedly for
 the result, or that you doubt either your power or your premises. But when men have
 realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more
 than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good
 desired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is the power
 of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is
 the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is
 the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every
 year if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon
 imperfect knowledge.166
 Alexander Meiklejohn's vision of the purposes of the first amendment
 was not as expansive as that of Holmes but his reasoning was similar. He
 argued that it was intended primarily to protect political discourse, that
 speech within the political arena was entitled to virtually absolute protection
 and that other speech was entitled only to that kind of procedural protection
 afforded lawful human activities.187 In the Meiklejohn variant of Holmes's
 doctrine, free speech was protected because it was necessary to a wise and
 informed electorate and it, in turn, was what made democracy function.
 Meiklejohn's variant could be at once too broad and too narrow. A concept
 of speech limited to politics unnecessarily narrows protected communica-
 tions and excludes communicative activities in certain areas of philosophy,
 scholarship and science. On the other hand, an extensive definition of
 "politics" or a broad understanding of what is necessary to the cultivation of
 a truly sophisticated electorate could include an extraordinarily broad range
 of speech.
 The approaches of Meiklejohn and Holmes, despite significant differ-
 ences, are both instrumental theories. Freedom of speech is important not
 because it is speech, but because free speech is necessary to the political
 process of self-government (Meiklejohn) or to the pursuit of truth
 (Holmes). Justice Black, in contrast, argued that freedom of speech was
 important because the constitution said it was. The instrumental approach,
 whether derived from Holmes, Meiklejohn, or others, has characterised
 much of twentieth-century American case law on issues of free speech and
 could generally be said to have been the dominant justification. It also forms
 168 Abrams v. United States , 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). For a rejection of the "market-place of ideas", see
 Baker, C. Edwin, "Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech", University of California at Los Angeles
 Law Review , XXV (June 1978), p. 964.
 187 See Meiklejohn, Alexander, Political Freedom (New York: Oxford Press, 1960) and Free Speech and
 Its Relation to Self-Government (New York: Harper and Row, 1948).
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 a solid base for the development of a universal theory of academic freedom.
 If truth is the goal, then the university is itself a paradigm of the Holmesian
 "market-place of ideas". Inquiry, discourse, argument, and criticism are all
 marks of an effective academic institution which, at its best, is an institution
 for the development of knowledge. The university has even been said to be
 the model on which the entire American political system is formed.168
 As a practical matter, an instrumentalist argument can be useful and often
 persuasive when trying to explain or to justify scholarly and scientific work
 to outsiders. The work may seem more palatable, more realistic, and
 perhaps even of some utility if it can be fitted into a model of critical inquiry
 into the nature of things which will be beneficial to all through increasing the
 stock of knowledge. Specific examples of "pure" research that has later had
 enormous practical effects can even be cited to the sceptic. This argument
 can also be used effectively when seeking to persuade non-academics of the
 importance of intellectual diversity and liberal education. A good example is
 the following:
 In today's world, a person is not fully educated unless he is able to think and see
 within more than one philosophic outlook. Commitment to a single vision may well be
 possible if it is comprehensive and detailed in its elaboration. But the capacity to get
 within the viewpoints of others is essential in a world of many cultures whose
 participants and leaders see and believe passionately in the ways they see and
 believe. There is a danger that the whole world will be made up of warring parochial
 and provincial factions, it is true. But the route for avoiding that fate is to provide
 mutual insight with disparate outlooks.169
 In other words, the world is full of differing viewpoints and we need to be
 educated about them to pursue our own interests.
 The ultimate utility of the instrumentalist approach is limited because the
 means - academic freedom and free speech - are justified strictly by
 reference to the end sought, and the end is often not justified at all. Thus the
 unquestioning application of an instrumentalist theory can lead to the
 treatment of educational institutions as no more than public utilities. Justice
 Holmes posited the search for truth as an ultimate good and argued that free
 speech, the "market-place of ideas", was the best means to that end. But if
 either the search for truth as a goal is denied, or a better path to that end is
 presented, then the argument for free speech falls to the ground. Similarly, if
 an end of vocational training in engineering is posited as an ultimate "good",
 then not liberal education, but strictly circumscribed engineering education
 could be justified as the best means to that end. The same shortcomings are
 apparent in the approach of Meiklejohn and in all strictly instrumentalist
 approaches to the justification of free speech and all that it implies.
 It should be observed that neither Meiklejohn nor Holmes left much room
 for speech which is primarily expressive. Individual silence, for instance,
 ma y not advance the pursuit of truth or enlighten the political conscience
 1M Emerson, Thomas, Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment (New York: Random House,
 1967), pp. 7-8.
 "• Keeton, Moms, Models and Mavericks (New York: McGraw Hill, 1971).
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 -although it might do so indirectly- but it may convey intense emo-
 tions or an outlook peculiar to an individual. Artistic expression, excla-
 mations of joy, old-fashioned ribaldry, all may contribute greatly to life,
 individuality, autonomy and humanity, but they may not be adequately
 justified by the instrumentalist theories espoused thus far by commentators
 and jurists. That is not to say that it is impossible to develop a broadly based
 theory which might encompass all kinds of human communications. But as
 long as the communicative element is treated simply as a means, then it is
 subject to manipulation in seeking to achieve whatever end may be sought.
 The individualistic theory makes speech the end in itself, not simply the
 desired means for achieving some other end. Speech is treated as a mani-
 festation of individual personality and external restrictions are to be rejected
 not because they interfere with free speech as part of the political process but
 because they interfere with an individual's own autonomous expression of
 his individuality. Judges have not generally justified the decisions in cases
 involving free speech on these individualistic grounds. The cases have
 tended much more towards the instrumentalist approach, although protec-
 tion has not been limited to the narrow arena of political speech as defined
 by Alexander Meiklejohn.170 In the cases dealing with privacy and "liberty",
 however, judges have been much more prone to use arguments based on a
 general concept of individual autonomy as an end in itself. For example, in
 the case of Stanley v. Georgia 171 the United States Supreme Court said that
 an individual is free "to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the
 privacy of his own home" and overturned a conviction for the private
 possession of obscene matter. In so doing the Court also cited with approval
 a dissenting opinion by Justice Brandeis in 1928 in which he described the
 "right to be let alone" in one's beliefs, feelings and intellect as "the right
 most valued by civilized men".1'2 The notion that there are decisions about
 life so fundamentally personal as to be free from external intrusions by
 reason of the nature of the decisions rather than by reason of their impor-
 tance to other ends has found expression in judicial decisions limiting state
 control of marriage,173 procreation,174 contraception,175 abortion,178 family
 relationships177 and child-rearing.178
 Explicit judicial recognition of purely individualistic justifications for
 limiting governmental intrusions or for providing means of redress for
 170 For example, the decision in the Virginia Pharmacy case (see n. 9 above), was justified by reference to
 the need to know comparative prices in order to make a rational economic decision.
 171 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
 171 Olmstead v. United States , 277 U.S. 438, 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
 171 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia , 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
 174 Skinner v. Oklahoma , 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
 175 Carey v. Population Services International , 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Criswold v. Connecticut , 381 U.S. 479
 (1965).
 ™Roe v. Wade , 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
 177 Moore v. City of East Cleveland , 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
 "■ Wisconsin v. Yodery 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v.
 Nebraska , 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See, Burt, Robert A., "Developing Constitutional Rights In and For
 Children", Law and Contemporary Problemst XXXIX (Summer 1975), p. 118. "Developments in the Law,
 the Constitution and the Family", Harvard Law Review , XCIII (May 1980), p. 1156.
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 private intrusions has been grudging, but it is clearly present in cases dealing
 with the nebulous concept of "liberty" protected by the fourteenth amend-
 ment. "Liberty" has come to encompass a variety of personal activities, such
 as those mentioned just above as well as those more clearly identified in the
 language of the constitution. This approach to constitutional interpretation
 was anathema to Justice Black, and it does offer occasions for direct conflicts
 between judges and legislators who may have quite different concepts of
 personal liberty. The current American debate about abortion is a good
 example. The conflict between the progressives of the early twentieth cen-
 tury who passed laws regulating economic activities and the judges who
 struck them down in the name of "liberty of contract" is another. Whatever
 the merits of the arguments about the development of a judicial concept of
 liberty as a method of constitutional interpretation, the important fact is that
 courts have done so and are doing so more and more. This breathes life into
 the argument that, as a matter of law, there are individual decisions, attri-
 butes, idiosyncracies, and manners of expression which are presumptively
 free from governmental regulations simply by reason of the individual
 citizen's individuality.
 Outside the confines of courtrooms the individualistic justifications for
 personal rights, including rights of communication, inquiry, and belief have
 been even louder and more clearly articulated. Nowhere is this more evident
 than in Professor Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia . In his very first
 sentence he states, "Individuals have rights, and there are things no person
 or group may do to them (without violating their rights)."179 He then goes
 on, at some length, to develop a theory of a morally justified minimal
 government which provides limited mechanisms for the protection of these
 rights from force, fraud, theft and so on. His government cannot, with moral
 justification, require citizens to aid others or prohibit activities just because
 they are not good for the person performing them. (He would have no laws
 against marijuana or cocaine.) He concludes his vision of utopia with a
 manifesto of pure individualism.
 The minimal state treats us as inviolate individuals, who may not be used in certain
 ways by others as means or tools or instruments or resources; it treats us as persons
 having individual rights with the dignity this constitutes. Treating us with respect by
 respecting our rights, it allows us, individually or with whom we choose, to choose
 our life and to realize our ends and our conception of ourselves, insofar as we can,
 aided by the voluntary cooperation of other individuals possessing the same dignity.
 How dare any state or group of individuals do more. Or less.180
 Professor Nozick's vision and the individualistic approach have a definite
 appeal, especially among those who are regularly engaged in affairs of the
 intellect in a somewhat isolated environment. It certainly provides a strong
 theoretical basis for resisting governmental regulation which interferes with
 the work of university teachers or students. And it values inquiry, speech
 179 Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. ix.
 180 Ibid. , pp. 333-34. A full appreciation of Professor Nozick s ideas is not possible without also reading the
 work of his colleague, Professor John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1971).
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 and writing as ends deserving of respect simply by virtue of their being and
 not in relation to anything else.
 Nevertheless, there are significant difficulties in applying the purely indi-
 vidualist approach, not the least of which is its unrealistic viewpoint.181 We
 are not in the process of creating new societies and new states in North
 America and Western Europe. We already have enormously complex
 societies with a welter of interrelationships which cannot realistically be
 undone into some primeval state of nature from which a Utopian minimal
 government can be forged. We have to take the arguments for individualism
 in the context of existing liberal-democratic social orders and see how they
 can be best used and adapted. The other fundamental shortcoming of
 modern theories of rights is their failure to articulate a justification for rights
 in the first instance. Professor Nozick simply says that everyone has rights
 and proceeds from there. In a severe criticism of Professor Nozick's views,
 the late Professor Arthur Leff asks the simple question, "Who says so?"1M
 The authors of the Declaration of Independence gave credit to God. "We
 hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they
 are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights . . ."18S In the
 absence of God, Professor Leff suggested that Robert Nozick's state must be
 populated with little "godlets".184 In fairness to Professor Nozick, the task
 he undertook was formidable enough and he was completely straightfor-
 ward in defining his initial assumptions. Professor Leff's critique is still not
 answered, however, nor can it be answered simply by an appeal to the
 "nature" of things.
 Pure individualistic theory is also of little utility when one is faced, in the
 real world, with conflicts between rights established by the positive law even
 when the antecedents of those rights can be traced, by theorists of rights, to
 some form of "natural law". Consider, for example, a man charged with a
 crime in the United States. He is entitled, by the specific language of the
 constitution, to call witnesses to testify on his behalf. Each of those witnesses
 is entitled to the constitutional right of free speech, which by both logic and
 law also includes the right to be silent.185 The interest in speaking or remain-
 ing silent is certainly important to the definition of individuality. Likewise,
 the accused defendant has a definite interest in remaining free from incar-
 ceration, most particularly if he happens to be innocent. What happens, then,
 if the defendant calls a witness to testify who is possessed of evidence that
 will exonerate the defendant and the witness, citing his right of free speech
 181 It is unlikely that the minimal state would give much support to universities. How many persons would
 part with their money voluntarily to support research by a classical scholar?
 181 Leff, Arthur A., "Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law Duke Law Journal y MCMLXXIX (December
 1979), p. 1229.
 God also plays a role m the reference to natural law m the Declaration of Independence: "When tn the
 course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have
 connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal
 station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect for the opinions of
 mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation."
 1M Leff, A. A., op. cit., pp. 1235-38.
 185 See Wooley v. Maynard , 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
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 which includes silence, refuses to testify? The pure theory of rights would say
 that neither the defendant nor the state can compel the witness to testify
 against his will. Hard luck for the defendant! He will have to use other
 evidence and hope for the best. The law, as it now exists, says otherwise. The
 witness will have to speak or be punished by going to jail himself,186 unless he
 has a good excuse for not speaking, e.g., that his testimony would be
 self-incriminating.
 Academic freedom also finds limited assistance in the purely individualistic
 approach. In the abstract, the notion of free and unfettered inquiry seems
 entirely consistent with a theory of individual rights. The pursuit of the
 interests subsumed under academic freedom is an exercise in the realisation
 of individuality which is at the centre of individualistic theory. But we do not
 live in Professor Nozick's minimal state and even if we did, it would not
 necessarily follow that academic freedom would flourish. An individual
 scholar in a Nozickian world has no claim against other individuals for
 support of his scholarly and scientific pursuits. To the extent that he cannot
 finance his activities himself, he can contract with others for the sale of his
 services. While this may work, it does not follow that the market for his
 services will coincide with his own interests or provide him with the
 resources necessary for serious research. The individual scholar's or scien-
 tist's interest in self-realisation may simply founder in the market-place of
 the minimal state and he will have no recourse, not to mention no job. He
 cannot, consistently with a legitimately derived theory of rights, demand
 that others support his work directly through payments or indirectly through
 taxes no matter what arguments he may present about the importance of his
 work to society or mankind at large. And to the extent that he is able to sell
 his services, the terms of the contract may limit the flexibility of his research.
 In the world in which we live relatively few scientists or scholars have the
 luxury of either personal wealth or unrestricted beneficence. Most depend
 on the government for financial support, and, therefore, live off funds
 compulsorily taken from others who may not be voluntary benefactors. The
 system itself is contrary to the basic precepts of the theorists of rights, and we
 are faced with the anomaly of trying to apply the theory of individual rights
 to an individual whose very livelihood is dependent upon a denial of that
 theory.
 Where does this leave us in trying to develop the defence of academic
 freedom, especially against an analogy with a public utility which is often
 appealing to those outside the university? From the point of view of the
 ordinary tax-payer it makes rough sense to think of universities in much the
 same way as a company producing and selling electricity. The electrical
 company provides kilowatts of electric energy as needed by various sectors
 of the economy. This model is perfectly consistent with an educational policy
 designed to produce engineers, teachers, doctors or scientists according to
 186 See e.g ., In re Färber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert, denied , 439 U.S. 997 (1978).
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 the demands of the market and to do research on prescribed projects. It can
 indeed be argued that the government or other social institutions should
 support universities and research institutions which do act precisely as public
 utilities and produce, on demand, vocationally educated specialists or
 research results specified in advance. There may be shortcomings in the
 methods of prediction of needs over the next five or ten years, but such
 shortcomings are arguments for better means of forecasting rather than
 arguments against support of universities as vocational schools and research
 institutions. A society could conceivably have a complex system of such
 institutions and get along without academic freedom. The decidedly
 instrumentalistic tenor of the analogy of a university with a public utility
 means that the freedom to teach and to inquire will be severely limited by
 prior, external determination by economic ends of the research to be
 done.187
 The first defence against a wholesale application of the model of public
 utility is to meet instrumentalism with instrumentalism. There is rarely any
 disagreement about the ultimate goals of higher education in free societies.
 The most ardent defender of academic freedom and the most militant of
 sceptical politicians will usually agree that universities should advance
 human knowledge and train each generation adequately for work and
 citizenship in a liberal democracy. The serious scholar or scientist would
 argue that these goals are less likely to be achieved in a system dominated by
 mechanisms of external control which place a premium on short-range
 achievements in vocational education and applied research. Education does
 not flourish in a tightly circumscribed curriculum, especially if the goal is to
 train specialists who are able to function in complex situations. A physicist,
 for instance, needs to know more than just mathematics and physics. To be
 fully effective he should also be able to write cogently in his own language
 and to read at least one or two other major languages. A little history,
 sociology and political science- not to mention philosophy and the class-
 ics - would not hurt in preparing him to place his own work accurately within
 the perspective of human knowledge. Support for the academic's argument...
 can be developed from history and tradition. There are risks, to be sure, but
 learning has flourished best when it is most free. In sum, the academic's
 instrumentalist argument is that Holmes was right. The "market-place of
 ideas" is the best known way to get at the truth and should be encouraged in
 the absence of any better approach.
 The instrumentalist argument for academic freedom need not deny the
 public utility analogy in its entirety. Not every institution of higher education
 need offer a liberal educational curriculum covering a broad range of sub-
 jects nor need it have a significant research component. There is room for
 187 These problems are particularly apparent in recent proposals of the Centre for Educational Research
 and Innovation of the OECD. See Hunter, H. O., "Universities and the Needs of Local and Regional
 Communities: Comments on the Outlook of the Centre for Educational Research and Innovation of the
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development", Minerva, XVm (Winter 1980), pp. 624-643.
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 diversity and pluralism among institutions reflective of the diversity of
 individuals in their respective societies. One of the dangers of the analogy
 with a public utility, moreover, is that higher education may be perceived to
 be an undifferentiated whole rather than a collection of separate, discrete
 institutions with varying tasks and aspirations.
 Another tendency in liberal democracies, and one closely related to the
 public utility analogy, is to use institutions such as universities as
 laboratories or instruments for the pursuit of social objectives such as
 equality. Democracy and egalitarianism are inextricably intertwined in the
 modern world but the constant danger is that a noble ideal - political and
 legal equality - can easily be perverted into a notion of complete equality
 that destroys the values of individuality, personal excellence and diversity.
 That is certainly the case when centralised bureaucratic reviews are under-
 taken to analyse admissions or appointive policies by looking only at statisti-
 cal evidence. This can implicate both the instrumentalist and individualistic
 arguments for academic freedom.
 The wholesale application of egalitarianism seriously undermines the
 functions of selection and certification which are assigned to universities by
 society and which are themselves necessary to the fulfilment of a university's
 role even when it is conceived as a public utility. Although these functions
 are not indispensable to free inquiry and discourse, they certainly are natural
 by-products of the educational process. If universities do not perform these
 functions, then some other institution must take up the slack or certification
 must occur through the free play of the market system. Certification by the
 market may satisfy those who argue that anyone who wants to be a physician
 should be allowed to be one, but it may not be altogether satisfactory for
 those who must suffer treatment by incompetent physicians. Even more
 important, egalitarian policies often seem to be focused on non-intellectual
 criteria; this may be a reaction against the previous evil of discrimination on
 the basis of other, equally non-intellectual criteria. This creates serious
 difficulties for universities, for the entire educational process centres about
 the activity of the intellect. Differences in mental abilities cannot be ignored
 if universities are to continue to perform their principal functions with any
 degree of excellence. The "market-place of ideas" must take into account
 intellectual abilities for the model to work with any degree of effectiveness.
 Furthermore, egalitarianism which is blind to individual differences denies
 the worth of an individual as an individual.
 It may be remarked, in passing, that universities have not helped them-
 selves by their own practice of limiting access to the wealthy or to those of
 high social status, and, by design or otherwise, excluding large, qualified
 sectors of society from higher education. Today many institutions continue
 to give preference to applicants who are the children of alumni or alumnae,
 who are superior athletes, or who come from a particular geographic local-
 ity. These practices make it difficult to justify an argument against a
 governmental policy which imposes "reverse discrimination" (which in
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 practice may turn into a form of preference) on the basis of race, sex, creed,
 national origin, age or handicap as the quid pro quo for governmental
 support.
 Arguments against the uncritical application of egalitarianism and in
 favour of academic freedom can be continued by instrumentalists so long as
 supporting evidence can be mustered. Such arguments are strengthened by
 reference to the positive law in the United States where free inquiry,
 whether in the academic situation or not, has long been valued and been
 treated as the model on which to build a liberal-democratic society.
 Instrumentalist theory can be made more convincing, however, with proper
 inclusion of individualistic arguments. Academic freedom is to be valued not
 only because it is the best means yet devised for seeking the truth - assuming
 the value of truth as a goal - but also because it provides self-realisation as
 the end in itself. That is certainly true for the scholar and the scientist
 although that does not explain why the government or anyone else should
 pay a university teacher to engage in "personal development". That can only
 be done by marrying the individual's end of free thought and inquiry with the
 instrumentalist argument. This can be done, first, by developing the indi-
 vidualistic values of academic freedom which require critical inquiry,
 rational discourse, and individual intellectual exertion, as the model for
 social order,188 and, second, by showing that the encouragement of these
 values in the university provides the best instrument for diffusing them
 throughout society. The first amendment to the United States Constitution
 and the cases applying it are a tempting field in which to search for analogies.
 The judges interpreting the first amendment, whatever their justifying
 theory, recognise individual intellectual freedom as a fundamental con-
 stituent of liberal democracy and limit the authority of the government to
 restrict that freedom, even when the state is paying for its exercise. As Judge
 Louis Pollak said when he was a professor of law:
 Much recent constitutional mythology has rotated about questions of relative orders
 of importance to be ascribed to various of the liberties that the Constitution protects.
 One may venture a mild skepticism about the worth, or indeed the feasibility, of
 working out a very exact table of constitutional valences. The ultimate purpose to be
 served by the Constitution is the creation of a cohesive community, endowed with a
 congeries of liberal values, and the withdrawal of any important value seriously
 impairs the worth of the community. Nevertheless, there is a well-founded consensus
 that the values of free thought and expression are crucial for a community which
 fosters the dignity and personal fulfillment of each individual. What underlies this
 consensus is the conviction, expressed by Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, that "free-
 dom of thought, and speech ... is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly
 every other form of freedom. With rare aberrations, a pervasive recognition of that
 truth can be traced in our history, political and legal."189
 "■ Patterns of internal government have, however, tended to be hierarchical rather than democratic. I am
 dealing, however, not with university government but with research and teaching.
 188 Pollak, L., op. cit. , pp. 3-4, citing Justice Cardozo's opinion for the Court m Palko v. Connecticut, 302
 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937). Perhaps by fusing the individualist and instrumentalist theories to the extent
 possible, some of the concerns about the implications of the Holmesian approach can be alleviated. See
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 The protection of academic freedom for those who are actively involved in
 scholarly pursuits, in order to protect their individual dignity and freedom,
 is the best known way to train succeeding generations in the processes of
 democratic citizenship and to develop respect for individual dignity. Not
 only does intellectual freedom provide the model, it also provides the
 process for strengthening institutions and traditions of political freedom and
 cultural diversity. With few exceptions, universities nowadays train the lead-
 ers of society and it is the model developed and practised within the univer-
 sity, and at earlier stages of education, which serves to inculcate the principal
 values of those persons, including an understanding of and appreciation for
 individual intellectual freedom.190
 Finally, academic freedom cannot be separated from any general theory
 of the freedom of expression. It is but one aspect of that freedom manifested
 within a particular institutional setting. Recognition of this fact subjects
 academic freedom to all the tensions and legal complexities attendant on
 expressive activities within a free society. But at the same time academic
 freedom is defined as part of the matrix of a liberal-democratic society, as a
 means in the search for knowledge and as an end in itself for the expression
 of individuality. The integration of the concept with the central themes of
 liberal democracy avoids the unfortunate and self-defeating conception of
 academic freedom as a privilege of a self-centred intellectual élite separated
 from the real world.
 Conclusion
 Academic freedom is essential to the survival of universities as free and
 open institutions devoted to the pursuit of truth. On that proposition most
 scholars and scientists would agree. Fortunately, the importance of this idea
 has been recognised by many persons outside universities although they are
 sometimes insensitive to the effects which particular policies have on the
 internal operations of a university. The idea is alive and is in a relatively
 flourishing condition, and, in the United States, it has its roots in the
 constitutionally protected freedoms of speech and press as well as the more
 amorphous idea of personal liberty. This provides an effective barrier to
 untrammelled governmental interference with universities even in institutions
 wholly supported by public revenues. Legal protection for academic free-
 dom is important not only for the protection which the law affords, as a
 matter of law, but also because legal protection amounts to a direct public
 recognition of the importance of academic freedom to society at large as well
 as to individual scholars and scientists.
 Bickel, Alexander, The Morality of Consent (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), p. 72; Wellington,
 Harry H., "On Freedom of Expression", Yale Law Journal, LXXXVIII (1979), p. 1105.
 190 In Professor Emerson's view: "[Ultimately any system of freedom of expression depends upon the
 existence of an educated, independent, mature citizenry. Consequently, realization of the objectives of the
 First Amendment requires educational institutions that produce graduates who are trained in handling ideas,
 judging facts and arguments, thinking independently, and generally participating effectively in the market-
 place of ideas. Hence the First Amendment could be said to require the kind of educational institutions that are
 capable of producing such results." Emerson, T., op. cit . , p. 613.
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 There is a danger in reliance on the law, however helpful or reassuring it
 may be. Constitutions and laws always threaten some degree of external
 intrusion into the university and can be damaging to the maintenance of a
 properly academic atmosphere. The law can also be fickle. The greatest
 protection for academic freedom has come and will continue to come from
 custom and tradition. Loss of respect for scientific scholarly activities in
 recent years has resulted in no small measure from loss of integrity among
 academics themselves. Arguments in favour of high standards of intellectual
 excellence and university autonomy are less compelling to outsiders when
 academics themselves engage in the promotion of internal anarchy and
 bickering and surrender to groups demanding the suspension of rigorous
 standards in admissions, appointments, promotions and internal academic
 government. If academic freedom is to survive, those engaged in the work of
 the university must remain true to its principles and must not fear to stand
 forthrightly for its values. The words of Judge Learned Hand on the
 preservation of liberty are instructive:
 What do we mean when we say first of all that we seek liberty? I often wonder
 whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon constitutions, upon laws and upon
 courts. These are false hopes; believe me, these are false hopes. Liberty lies in the
 hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can
 save it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it. While it lies
 there it needs no constitution, no law, no court to save it.191
 191 Hand, Learned, The Spirit of Liberty : Papers and Addresses , ed. I. Dillard (Chicago: University of
 Chicago Press, 1960), p. 189.
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